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With the issuance of Crawford v. Washington2 by the United States Supreme Court on March 8, 
2004, wide spread confusion and concern swept through the nation’s prosecutorial community.  
The new rule announced in Crawford created too many questions and provided few answers by 
the Court.  In particular, anxiety arose from the child protection community in regard to one 
primary issue:  Are forensic interviews of child victims and witnesses, and other statements 
made by children, considered “testimonial statements” according to Crawford, thus 
requiring the child to take the witness stand? 
The Court further confused the new rule with the combined opinions in Davis v. Washington and 
Indiana v. Hammon.3 In that opinion, the court focused on the issue of excited utterances and 
utterances through 911 emergency calls primarily occurring from domestic violence situations, 
and whether emergency situations fall into the definition of a “testimonial statement.”  In its 
opinion of June 2006, the Court developed a new “primary purpose” test where courts will now 
objectively view the circumstances surrounding the purpose of the law enforcement investigator 
in speaking with the witness.4
Thus, the question after Davis/Hammon becomes “what is the primary purpose of the 
interrogation by law enforcement” and how does this work with the Crawford objective 
reasonable person factor?   This article will analyze: (1) whether forensic interviews are 
testimonial statements under the new rule set forth in Crawford; (2) how courts across the 
country are inaccurately analyzing Crawford in relation to child forensic interviews; (3) how 
courts should handle statements made by children to medical professionals and others taking 
their statements; and (4) how the United States Supreme Court, and lower courts, are sacrificing 
its young5 child victims and witnesses by imposing cognitively impossible adult thought 
processes on very young children.   
 
II.  THE NEW RULE OF CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON 
 
Crawford v. Washington addressed whether a taped custodial statement made by the defendant’s 
wife could be admitted as substantive evidence against the defendant, her husband, when the 
wife did not testify at trial as a result of marital privilege.  The prosecutor in Crawford was 
permitted to introduce the videotape at trial since statements made by the defendant’s wife were 
statements against her penal interest.  On appeals at the state level, the Washington Court of 
Appeals and Washington Supreme Court addressed the introduction of the taped statement on 
reliability and trustworthiness grounds pursuant to Ohio v. Roberts.6
2 514 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 126 S. Ct. 2266 (U.S. 2006). 
 
4 Id. at *16.   
 
5 For purposes of this article, the term “young child” refers to children under the age of ten. 
6 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  The Roberts Court held that if a witness becomes unavailable at trial, the prosecutor 
has the burden to prove unavailability of that witness and that the hearsay statement falls into a firmly rooted 
exception, or has “indicia of reliability” or trustworthiness.    
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The United States Supreme Court overturned the conviction against the defendant and analyzed 
the admission of Mrs. Crawford’s statement on purely Sixth Amendment confrontation grounds.  
In doing so, the Court set forth a new rule regarding admission of hearsay testimony when the 
witness is unavailable to testify.  The new rule provides:  “where testimonial statements are 
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
confrontation.” 7 Thus, if an out-of-court statement by a witness is deemed testimonial, the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires that the witness testify and be subject to 
confrontation or cross-examination before admitting any out-of-court statements. 
 
A.   Testimonial statements now require confrontation
Before Crawford, courts would revert to the Rules of Evidence and a line of cases stemming 
from Ohio v. Roberts8 to assess whether out-of-court hearsay statements would be reliable and 
trustworthy in order to be admitted at trial.  The Crawford Court overturned Roberts and set forth 
a new rule that requires witnesses to testify at trial, and be subject to cross examination, before 
admitting any out-of-court testimonial hearsay statements from that witness.  In announcing the 
new rule, the United States Supreme Court failed to provide a clear definition of what constitutes 
a “testimonial statement” and stated “[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of "testimonial."9 Nonetheless, the court outlined three core 
classifications of statements that might be considered testimonial:   
 
(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is, material such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,"  
(2) "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," (citations 
omitted); or  
(3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial." 10 
In looking to the foundation of the Sixth Amendment, the Crawford Court focused on witnesses 
who “bear testimony against the accused” and found that “"[t]estimony," in turn, is typically "[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."”11 
7 Crawford, 514 U.S. at 54. 
 
8 448 U.S. 56 (1980).    
 
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.  That later day appeared to have arrived on June 19, 2006, when the Court 
issued the combined opinions in Davis and Hammon, yet again failed to provide a comprehensive definition of what 
constitutes a testimonial statement.  126 S. Ct. 2266; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886 (2006). 
 
10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 28. 
 
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.   
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The Court further held that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.” Thus, if a witness previously testified and an opportunity to cross-
examination was provided, that testimony may later be admitted in court if the witness is 
unavailable.  In the end, the Supreme Court minimally agreed that a “testimonial statement” 
could come from statements provided in “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial; and police interrogations.”12 
B. Post-Crawford Courts struggle to define the parameters of “testimonial statements.”
Post-Crawford courts have struggled with defining testimonial statements and have held that 
testimonial statements include testimony from a preliminary hearing,13 before a grand jury,14 at a 
deposition,15 at trial,16 or at a former trial;17 affidavits;18 witness responses to police 
 
12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
 
13 State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308 (Kan. 2004) (A witness was unavailable for trial but testified at preliminary 
hearing.  The Defendant was represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing and had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. The Defendant’s counsel did not cross-examine the witness at preliminary examination, but 
was afforded that opportunity.  The Defendant’s counsel’s failure to cross-examine the witness does not equate to a 
Confrontation Clause violation and does not bar the preliminary hearing testimony from admission at trial due to 
unavailability of the witness.).  Although statements at a preliminary hearing are testimonial in nature, if the 
statements were subject to confrontation and the witness later becomes unavailable, the testimony may be later 
admitted, pursuant to FRE 804(b)(1), as confrontation was satisfied.  For support, see, Schneider v. Commonwealth, 
47 Va. App. 609, 625 S.E.2d 688 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985 (Conn. 2006); People v. 
Stewart, No. 246334, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2110 (Mich. Ct. App. August 10,2004); State v. Newell, 2005 Ohio 
2848 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); People v. Ochoa, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1551(Cal. Ct. App.  2004); Primeaux v. State, 88 
P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) 
 
14 United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir.  2005); United States v. Thompson, No. 4:05CR00161 HEA, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27763 (E.D. Mo. November 14,2005) (Grand jury testimony, not subject to cross 
examination, of a deceased witness may be admitted at a subsequent suppression hearing because hearsay is 
admissible at suppression hearings); People v. Howell, 831 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (confrontation violation 
to admit grand jury testimony at trial of non-testifying witness due to inability to cross examine during the grand 
jury testimony.); People v. Patterson, 808 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (if witness testifies at grand jury and is 
not subject to cross examination, the grand jury testimony cannot be admitted at trial unless the witness testifies at 
trial and is subject to cross examination regarding testimony given before the grand jury.) 
 
15 Oliver v. Hendricks, No. 04-4219, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34914 (D.N.J. May 31, 2006) (A witness was 
terminally ill with cancer and unlikely to survive until trial.  The witness was deposed and the defense was given an 
opportunity to cross examine at the deposition.  At trial, the court found the witness to be unavailable and properly 
admitted the deposition.  There was no Crawford violation.); Simmons v. State, No. CACR04-1279 2006 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 276 (Ark. Ct. App. April 19, 2006) (“We hold that a deposition taken in anticipation of a future civil trial 
constitutes a "testimonial" statement as required by Crawford. *** [A]lthough Simmons's civil attorney chose not to 
cross examine Desanto during the deposition, criminal charges had been filed against Simmons, and his attorney had 
the opportunity to depose Desanto. The civil trial and the criminal trial involved the same facts and the same 
participants. The attorney for the co-defendant that cross examined Desanto had the same motive as Simmons--to 
discredit his testimony regarding the sexual encounters.”  No violation for admitting the deposition at the criminal 
trial.); United States v. Moffie, No. 1:04 CR 567, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462 (N.D. Ohio May 11,2005) (prior civil 
deposition testimony of a defendant is admissible as a party-admission in a subsequent criminal case); State v. Ash, 
611 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ; Liggins v. Graves, No. 4:01-cv-40166, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4889 (S.D. 
Iowa  March 24,2004) (videotaped deposition may be admitted in a later trial so long as the witness is unavailable 
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interrogation;19 co-defendant confessions and plea allocutions of co-defendants that implicate 
other defendants.20 On the other hand, these hearsay statements have been deemed non-
 
and was subject to cross examination at the deposition); and Howard v. State, 816 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 2004) (a pre-
trial deposition, providing an opportunity for cross-examination, may later be admitted at trial if the witness is 
unavailable.) 
 
16 People v. Whitley, No. 1936-2002,  11 Misc. 3d 1084A,  (N.Y. County Ct. 2006) (Introducing the prior 
trial testimony of two unavailable witnesses at this trial will not violate Crawford since the defendant had a previous 
opportunity to cross-examine.); Farmer v. State, 124 P.3d 699 (Wyo. 2005) (A key witnessed testified at defendant’s 
first trial, but was not able to be located for the second trial.  Admission of the transcript from the first trial did not 
violate defendant’s confrontation rights.  Defendant claimed that the cross-examination at the first trial was 
insufficient.  The court denied this claim and held that under federal rules, a defendant need only be given the 
“opportunity” to cross-examine, not a cross-examination that is effective.); State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 
2005) (The transcript of an unavailable witness who testified previously at a co-defendant’s separate trial cannot be 
utilized during another defendant’s trial as the testimony is deemed testimonial and would violate the defendant’s 
right to confrontation.).   
 
17 United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5thCir. 2004) (A murder case was tried in state court and resulted in 
an acquittal, and was then subsequently tried in federal court.  The main witness in the state trial died prior to the 
federal trial, but his original state trial testimony was properly admitted in the federal trial since the witness was 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.)   
 
18 Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 2266; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (U.S. 2006) (the affidavit from a victim of an 
alleged domestic assault, detailing the crime, was testimonial in nature as it was taken to preserve the victim’s 
account of a past crime); People v. Pacer, 21 A.D.3d 192 (N.Y. App. Div.  2005) (An affidavit of regularity/proof of 
mailing sworn regarding a driver’s license revocation order was not a business record from a regularly conducted 
business activity and was testimonial); United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142-JAR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10067 (D. Kan. May 23,2005) (witness affidavits are testimonial under Crawford). 
 
19 Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 2266; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (U.S. 2006) (“Statements 
are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution”); State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (excited utterances made after police questioning 
are testimonial); People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (excited victim who calms down and is 
subject to interview by police is testimonial); People v. Cortes,  781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2004) (interrogation by 911 operator is testimonial); Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(witness statements given to police officers are testimonial); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832 (8th  Cir.  2004) 
("an accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who 
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) 
(police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as interrogation and is testimonial); State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 
830 (N.C. 2005) (a police photo line up identification is testimonial). 
 
20 See, State v. Alston, 900 A.2d 1212 (R.I. 2006); State v. Walters, 137 P.3d 645 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); 
People v. Pipes, 715 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 2006); United States v. Becker, No. 01 Cr. 156 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2076 (S.D.N.Y. January 17, 2006); United States v. Alfonso, 158 Fed. Appx. 356 (2nd Cir. 2005); State v. Vincent, 
120 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); United States v. Bermudez, 138 Fed. Appx. 339 (2d Cir.  2005); State v. 
Sanlin, No. W2004-00841-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2005); 
United States v. Rozenfeld, 131 Fed. Appx. 759 (2d Cir. . 2005); United States v. Molina, 407 F.3d  511 (1st Cir.  
2005); United States v. Foster, 127 Fed. Appx.  537 (2d Cir.  2005); United States v. Massino, 319 F.Supp. 2d 
295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); People v. Woods, 9 A.D.3d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); United States v. Sherry, 107 Fed. 
Appx. 253 (2d Cir.  2004); United States v. Tusaneza, 116 Fed. Appx. 305 (2d Cir.  2004); United States v. De La 
Cruz, 114 Fed. Appx 293 (2d Cir.  2004); United States v. Hundley, No. 02 Cr. 441 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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testimonial thus far:  (1) hearsay statement admitted at probation revocation or supervised release 
revocation proceedings since the right of confrontation is not afforded in those hearings;21 (2) 
casual statements made to an acquaintance or family member;22 (3) co-conspirator statements 
made in furtherance of the conspiracy;23 (4) brief, informal, remarks to an officer who is 
 
21574 (S.D.N.Y. October 28, 2004); State v. Cutlip, 2004 Ohio 2120 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Brooks v. State, 132 
S.W.3d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); People v. Bell, 689 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Pullen, 594 
S.E.2d 248  (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Roy v. Coplan, 2004 DNH 56 (D.N.H. 2004). 
 
21 See, State v. Crace, 2006 Ohio 3027 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (community control revocation hearing); State v. 
Rose, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS 54 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); United States v. Wooden, 179 Fed. Appx. 601 (11th Cir.  
2006); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.  2006); State v. Lewis, No. 55582-1-I 2006 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 113 (Wash. Ct. App. January 30, 2006); Commonwealth v. Wilcox,  841 N.E.2d 1240 (Mass. 2006); 
Commonwealth v. Nunez, 841 N.E.2d 1250 (Mass. 2006); Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 841 N.E.2d 1235 (Mass. 
2006); Russell v. State, 920 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  2006);  
United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980 (9th Cir.2005); United 
States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621 (6th Cir.  2005); United States v. Morris, 140 Fed. Appx. 138 (11th Cir.  2005); Young 
v. United States, 863 A.2d 804 (D.C. 2004); Jenkins v. State, No. 133, 2004 Del. LEXIS 549 (Del. 2004); People v. 
Johnson, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1409 (Cal. Ct.  App.  2004); People v. Turley, 109 P.3d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); 
United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332 (2d Cir.  2004); United States v. Barazza, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (S.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 
22 See, Griffin v. State, 631 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 2006) (statement of a deceased victim to a friend was non-
testimonial); United States v. Portocarrero-Reina, No. 8:05-CR-365-T-27TBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47080 (M.D. 
Fla. July 12, 2006) (“Crawford does not apply either to "casual remark[s] made to an acquaintance" or statements 
made unwittingly to a government informant, as those statements are not "testimonial".”); State v. Miller,  896 A.2d 
844 (Conn. Ct. App. 2006) (A casual remark to a friend is not deemed testimonial under Crawford.); State v. Aaron 
L., 865 A.2d 1135 (Conn. 2005) (casual statement by a two-and-one-half year old child victim to her mother was 
non-testimonial); United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390 (6th Cir.  2005); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832 
9162 (8th Cir  2004); People v. Cervantes, 118 Cal. App. 4th 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant’s confession was 
made to a witness to explain injuries he received during the commission of the murder and with reasonable 
expectation it would not be repeated.  This was non-testimonial).   
 
23 See, United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248 (4th Cir.  2006); United States v. Amato, No. 03-CR-1382, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38176 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2006); State v. Whitaker, 135 P.3d 923 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); 
Bowden v. State, 630 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Crespo-Hernandez, No. 05-10461, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11576 (5th Cir.  May 9,2006); United 
States v. Peak, No. 05-510 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21379 (E.D. Pa. April 20,2006); United States v. Abram, 171 
Fed. Appx. 304 (11th Cir.  2006); United States v. Bridgeforth, 441 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Reynolds, 171 Fed. Appx. 961 (3rd Cir. 2006); United States v. Brooks, 173 Fed. Appx. 848 (1st Cir.  2006); State v. 
Hand, 840 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 2006); United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2006); State v. Breeden, No. 
E2004-01512-CCA-R3-CD  2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1257 (Tenn. Crim. App. November 30,2005); United 
States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2005); Harris v. Moore, No. 03-5847, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29265 (D.N.J. 
November 22, 2005) (tape recorded phone conversation); Jones v. State, 834 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65 (1st Cir.  2005); United States v. Wilson, 148 Fed. Appx. 602 (9th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2005); People v. Wahlert, No. E035174, 2005 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 1108 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. July 19,2005); United States v. Hoffman, No. 04-334-1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5572 (E.D. Pa. April 5,2005); Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836 (Miss. 2005); United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290 
(5th Cir.  2005); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2005); Wiggins v. State, 152 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2004); United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278 (5th Cir 2004); United States v. Cozzo, No. 02 CR 400,  
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7391 (N.D. Ill. April 28, 2004); State v. Saechao, 98 P.3d 1144 (Or. Ct. App. 2004); Llaca v. 
Duncan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7916 (S.D.N.Y.May 4, 2004). 
 
- 7 -
conducting a field investigation;24 (5) dying declarations;25 and (6) business records and public 
records.26 
C. The United States Supreme Court never defined “testimonial statements” prior to 
Crawford
Despite the lack of guidance provided by the Crawford court, cases predating Crawford 
referenced the term “testimonial” in many scenarios; yet no case defined the term in relation to 
the new rule of Crawford. The earliest case utilizing the term “testimonial” in relation to 
statements of witnesses was Valdez v. United States.27 The opinion referenced “[t]he alleged 
right of a defendant to be present at a view cannot be derived from the right of confrontation with 
witnesses given by the Sixth Amendment. Such right applies only to testimonial evidence.”  The 
case of White v. Illinois,28 started us on the road toward “testimonial statements” through a 
concurring opinion written by Justices Scalia and Thomas:  “The federal constitutional right of 
 
24 People v. Newland, 6 A.D.3d 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).  
 
25 See, People v. Mayo, 140 Cal. App. 4th 535 (Cal. Ct. App.  2006); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 
2006); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 69 Va. Cir. 228 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005); People v. Paul, 25 A.D.3d 165 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005) (Dying declarations made by the deceased victim to two civilian eyewitnesses were not non-testimonial 
under both Professor Amar and Professor Friedman’s tests.); Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
State v. Jones, No. A04-1284, 2005 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 142 (August 9, 2005); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 
578 (Minn. 2005); People v. Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Commonwealth v. Salaam, 65 Va. Cir. 
405 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004); People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956 (Cal. 2004); State v. Nix, 2004 Ohio 5502 (Ohio 2004).  
However, be aware that one case has found dying declarations to be testimonial under Crawford.  See, United States 
v. Jordan, No. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3289 (D. Colo. March 3, 2005) 
 
26 See, Acuna v. Commonwealth, No. 1396-05-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 306 (Va. Ct. App. July 11, 2006) (a 
record from Department of Motor Vehicles); Johnson v. State, No. 05-05-00848-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 
5460 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27, 2006) (DNA report); Fencher v. State, 931 So. 2d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (rape kit records); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006) (autopsy report); United States v. Salazar-
Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir.  2006) (a Certificate of Non-Existence of Record); United States v. Evans, 178 
Fed. Appx. 747 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. McIntosh, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11057 (7th Cir. Ill. 2006); United 
States v. Page, 169 Fed. Appx. 782 (4th Cir. W.Va. 2006) (a certified penitentiary packet); Michels v. 
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 624 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (documents from the Delaware Secretary of 
State); Smith v. State, 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 2442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (cell phone records); United States v. King, 
161 Fed. Appx. 296 (4th Cir.. 2006); Sproule v. State, 927 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (a certified driving 
record); People v. Romano, 9 Misc. 3d 1127A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (computerized record of the Department of 
Finance, Parking Violations Bureau, listing the effective date and the expiration date of the license plate of [a car] is 
a routine business record); United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552 (N-M.Ct. Crim. App.. 2006) (service record entries 
for a period of unauthorized absence);   United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir.  2005) (a warrant of 
deportation record); State v. Bellerouche, 120 P.3d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (trespass notice); Peterson v. State, 
911 So. 2d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. . 2005) (department of corrections records); Ellis v. Phillips, No. 04 Civ. 7988, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13910 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (DNA results); Eslora v. State, No. 04-04-00112-CR , 2005 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 2564 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005)  (Medical records); Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) 
(Autopsy reports); People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (Judgment of conviction); United States 
v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, 111 Fed. Appx. 732 (5th Cir.. 2004) (Immigration records). 
 
27 244 U.S. 432 (1917).   
 
28 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
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confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause 
is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”29 In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on cases that address testimonial 
privileges;30 testimonial incrimination by a defendant;31 and testimonial compulsion of a 
defendant.32 Yet, no case from the United States Supreme Court provided a pre-Crawford 
definition of a testimonial statement.  Crawford, and now Davis and Hammon, continue the 
pattern of vagueness by failing to establish clear guidelines on testimonial versus non-testimonial 
statements.  As a result, prosecuting attorneys and their investigators do not know what out-of-
court statements of unavailable witnesses are eligible for admission in court. 
 
D. The United States Supreme Court provides a limited definition of “testimonial 
statements” in Davis and Hammon
When provided the opportunity to clarify the meaning of a “testimonial statement” in Davis v. 
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Court only provided a definition for these two cases 
and those like them: 
 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements -- or even all conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogation -- as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the 
present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.33 
In a footnote to the above ruling, the Court noted the following:  “Our holding refers to 
interrogations because, as explained below, the statements in the cases presently before us are the 
products of interrogations -- which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial responses. 
This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are 
necessarily nontestimonial.”34 
29 White, 502 U.S. at 365.   
 
30 Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 
31 Braswell v. U.S., 487 U.S. 99 (1988). 
 
32 U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 
33 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *16. 
 
34 126 S. Ct. at 2274.. 
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E. An Effective Test to Utilize to Determine a Testimonial Statement
In struggling with the open field of interpretations on what constitutes a testimonial statement, an 
effective test arising out of the Crawford decision can be determined, and lower courts have 
addressed these two factors in determining whether a statement was testimonial:  (1) Was a 
governmental agent involved in creating the testimony or in taking a formalized statement and 
(2) Would an objective declarant reasonably expect his/her statement to later be used at trial?35 
Consistent with the three classifications outlined in the Crawford opinion, if the answer to both 
questions is in the affirmative, then the statement should be deemed testimonial requiring the 
witness to testify.  If the answer to either prong is in the negative, then the statement should be 
deemed non-testimonial, thus allowing for admission of the statement through the hearsay 
exceptions in the Rules of Evidence.36 
For example, if an out-of-court statement is taken by a government agent (e.g. police officer, 
prosecutor, or child protective services (CPS) worker employed by the state), the statement will 
be considered testimonial so long as the witness reasonably could expect that statement would 
later be used at trial.  However, if the statement is deemed testimonial, but was subject to 
confrontation at a prior time37 and if the witness is unavailable38 for trial, that statement may still 
be admitted as the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause was previously satisfied. 
 
35 For a limited sampling of cases, see, Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006) 
(although the police were present at the hospital, the police did not conduct the examination of the child, and a child 
in that position would not anticipate her statements would be used in court); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 
2006) (a physician conducted the examination of the child, and no police officer was present, plus the seven-year-
old child would not have believed his statementw would later be used in court); People v. McBean, 819 N.Y.S.2d 
368 (N.Y. App. Div.. 2006) (Co-defendant’s statements to an unknown undercover agent that implicated the 
defendant were non-testimonial for the reason that the co-defendant was unaware that she was speaking to an 
undercover agent, her statement lacked formality, and she did not anticipate that her statement would be used in 
trial.); Jensen v. Pliler, 439 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2006) (admission of a deceased co-defendant’s attorney-client 
privileged statements to his defense attorney were held non-testimonial because the co-defendant would not believe 
his statement would be used in court, and his attorney was not a governmental agent); State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 
823 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (cited the two-part test as originally published in A Flurry of Court Interpretations:  
Weathering the Storm after Crawford v Washington, by Allie Phillips, J.D., 38:6THE PROSECUTOR, (November-
December 2004)); United States v. Griggs, No. 04 Cr. 428 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23695 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“the 
Second Circuit has subsequently stated that a declarant's statements are testimonial if they are ‘knowing responses to 
structured questioning in an investigative environment or a courtroom setting where the declarant would reasonably 
expect that his or her responses might be used in future judicial proceedings.’").   
 
36 Fed. R. Evid. 801-807. 
 
37 For example, at a preliminary hearing (probable cause hearing) which provided the defendant an 
opportunity to cross examine the witness. 
38 Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) outlines the rules of unavailability as follows:  “"Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant--(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death 
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a 
statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under 
subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.  A 
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As a result of the imprecise new rule, prosecutors are questioning whether firmly-rooted hearsay 
exceptions were still valid, whether convictions would be remanded for retrial due to retroactive 
application of Crawford to active cases and those pending on direct appeal,39 and whether 
incompetent witnesses (particularly young children) would ever get their statements heard in 
court or have their cases effectively prosecuted without their testimony.  Of great concern to 
prosecutors is proceeding to trial if a witness or victim is unavailable to testify.  
With the issuance of Davis/Hammon, including the Court’s new eye toward the “primary 
purpose” of the interviewer, it is important to note that the court limited its ruling to law 
enforcement interrogations40, commenting, “even when interrogation exists, it is in the final 
analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause 
requires us to evaluate.”41 Further, “our holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether 
and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are 
‘testimonial.’”42 Thus, the court limited the application of the Davis/Hammon “primary 
purpose” ruling to similar cases (interrogations by law enforcement arising out of emergency 
situations) and did not extinguish the reasonable objective declarant standard set forth in 
Crawford.
F.     The Impossibility of Applying the Crawford, Davis and Hammon Rules to Child Victims
Every facet of prosecution has been greatly impacted by the Crawford decision.  Particularly 
hard-hit are cases of child abuse, domestic violence, elder abuse and other violent crimes where 
witness intimidation may occur or the witness is unavailable to testify due to injury, trauma, 
youthfulness, or death.  Child abuse cases have been disproportionately impacted by the new rule 
because the Crawford decision fails to take into account the more sensitive cases that have 
unavailable or incompetent witnesses.  When a three-year-old child victim provides an articulate 
and detailed account regarding the abuse at a forensic interview, yet is deemed incompetent by a 
trial judge to take an oath in court to provide the same testimony, Crawford may potentially bar 
this testimony.  The result seems absurd, yet is occurring with frequency throughout the country.   
 
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due 
to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from 
attending or testifying.” 
39 Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783 (6th Cir 2005); Bintz v. 
Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir.  2005); United States v. Jones, 176 Fed. Appx. 920 (10th Cir.  2006); In re 
Rutherford, 437 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2006).  However, a contrary result has occurred in the Ninth Circuit, beginning 
with Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir.  2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3639 (U.S. May 15, 2006) (No. 
05-595).  
40 Davis, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *16 (footnote 1). 
 
41 Davis, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *16 (footnote 1). 
 
42 Davis, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *17 (footnote 2). 
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When a child makes statements at a forensic interview43 regarding criminal conduct, these 
interviews are often conducted by a governmental agent (child protection service worker or 
police officer).  So should the child’s statement be barred as a testimonial statement if the child 
does not or cannot testify?  Some courts have answered in the affirmative and have closed the 
courtroom doors to young victims.  What some courts have failed to consider is the other 
analysis of Crawford: Can an objective declarant in the child’s position reasonably understand 
and expect that his/her statements made during a forensic interview could later be used in court?   
 
If courts are to apply the Davis/Hammon “primary purpose” rule to forensic interviews of 
children, invariably every statement from a child, regardless of age or understanding of the 
process, would be deemed testimonial.  For example, if a police officer, trained in conducting 
forensic interviews, obtains statements from a five-year-old child victim regarding abuse, 
arguably the officer’s “primary purpose” in speaking with the child would be to obtain sufficient 
information in order to further investigate and/or arrest the offender.  Thus, the “primary 
purpose” of the interview would be to document facts of a past crime for purposes of 
prosecution.  Therefore, the statements made by the child would be deemed testimonial pursuant 
to Davis/Hammon. Yet when conducting an inquiry into the same factual scenario under the 
Crawford analysis and determining whether an objective witness in the five-year-old child’s 
position would reasonably expect the statement to be used in court, the answer should clearly be 
no.  The absurdity of the “primary purpose” analysis is apparent when attempting to apply the 
limited scope of the rule to children.  However, several courts have taken this step and analyzed 
a young child’s statements under the “primary purpose” rule and found that the statements were 
testimonial.44 
Under the minimal guidance provided by the Crawford Court, statements made by a young child 
to a law enforcement officer or child protection worker cannot be deemed testimonial if the child 
cannot reasonably comprehend that the statements may be later used in court and is not acting in 
the capacity of a “witness”.  As noted by Professor Richard Friedman, young children making a 
statement to the authorities may not understand that sexual abuse is wrong or that a perpetrator is 
subject to punishment as a result.45 If so, “it seems dubious to say that the children acting in 
these cases were acting as witnesses.”46 
The United States Supreme Court failed to take into account the broad sweeping implications the 
undefined new rule would have on unavailable or incompetent witnesses.  The Court made clear 
that the new rule of Crawford was taking aim at the evil of trials by affidavit or trials by hearsay.  
The Court articulated that the new rule of Crawford, and reiterated in Davis/Hammon, was aimed 
at witnesses who bear testimony against an accused.  Do young children who disclose abuse to 
 
43 See Section III for an explanation of a child forensic interview. 
 
44 State v. Krasky, 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn Ct App. 2005), rev’d 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (six-
year-old’s statements to a nurse practitioner were testimonial); State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS 
83 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (six-year-old’s statements to a nurse were testimonial). 
 
45 Richard D. Friedman, Children as Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process: The Conundrum of 
Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 250 (2002).   
 
46 Id.
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their parent, or to a forensic interviewer in a child-friendly setting, understand that they are a 
witness bearing testimony?  The answer is, and should be, no.  The research studies following in 
this article will outline how statements from very young child abuse victims must be analyzed in 
the wake of Crawford v. Washington, and how appellate courts throughout the country, with a 
few exceptions, are also failing our youngest and most vulnerable victims.   
 
III.  THE FORENSIC INTERVIEW PROCESS FOR CHILD VICTIMS 
 
A forensic interview can be defined in many terms, but primarily is a method for obtaining an 
accurate account of events from a child.  “The primary goal of the investigative or forensic 
interview is to obtain and preserve information that the victim is uniquely able to provide.  If the 
child is able to talk, a thorough interview is the first and probably the single most important part 
of the investigation. It will serve in almost all cases as the basis for evaluating the child’s 
credibility.”47 There are several effective forensic interview protocols and training programs 
throughout the country that properly train child protection professionals in how to talk to 
children about abuse.48 
The R.A.T.A.C.™ protocol, created by CornerHouse Interagency Child Abuse Evaluation and 
Training Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is utilized in partnership with the American 
Prosecutors Research Institute in the Finding Words™ five-day forensic interviewing course.  
R.A.T.A.C.™ is the acronym for Rapport, Anatomy Identification, Touch Inquiry, Abuse 
Scenario, and Closure.49 The R.A.T.A.C.™ protocol is a semi-structured protocol, which means 
that a trained forensic interviewer may move between the five phases according to the wishes 
and developmental ability of the child, or the disclosure being given, and is not confined to 
moving through the phases in order.  This allows for more flexibility in the interview, as well as 
accommodation to the child being interviewed.  The foundation to R.A.T.A.C.™ is the Child 
First Doctrine, which requires that the needs of the child always come first.50 
47 APRI’S NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF 
CHILD ABUSE 37 (Sage Publications ed., 3rd ed.  2004) 
 
48 There are a number of organizations that provide quality forensic interviewing training, including the 
National Child Advocacy Center’s Forensic Interview model in Huntsville, Alabama; the American Professional 
Society on the Abuse of Child (APSAC), the Childhood Trust based out of the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital 
Medical Center, and First Witness in Minnesota. 
 
49 The CornerHouse protocol is also used in the 17 states that are part of the American Prosecutors Research 
Institute’s Half-A-Nation by 2010 Program and Finding Words™ coalition.  Those states include:  Minnesota, South 
Carolina, Indiana, New Jersey, Mississippi, Georgia, Missouri, Illinois, Maryland, West Virginia, Kansas, Ohio, 
Arkansas, Delaware, Virginia, Connecticut and Oklahoma.  Two to three states continue to join the program each 
year. 
 
50 The Child First Doctrine: is "The child is our first priority.  Not the needs of the family.  Not the child's 
'story.'  Not the evidence.  Not the needs of the courts.  Not the needs of the police, child protection, attorneys, etc.  
The child is our first priority." Ann Ahlquist & Bob Ryan (1993). Interviewing Children Reliably and Credibly: 
Investigative Interview Workbook. Minneapolis, MN: CornerHouse Interagency Child Abuse Evaluation and 
Training Center. 
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Common to most protocols, including R.A.T.A.C.™, is a multi-disciplinary team approach to the 
interview to reduce the frequency with which the child will be interviewed.  Multi-disciplinary 
teams primarily consist of a prosecuting attorney, law enforcement investigator, child protection 
services investigator, a forensic interviewer, and a health care provider (medical and 
psychological professionals).  Each member of the team is interested in different aspects of the 
single interview.  For example, the child protection services worker may be interested in 
knowing whether the offender was living in the home of the child and, if so, will then need to 
find foster care placement for that child if the offender is not removed.  The medical provider 
may be listening for any statement from the child that would warrant a physical examination or 
sexual assault examination.  The psychological professional may determine that based on the 
disclosure, the child is in need of immediate therapeutic invention for the child’s best interests.  
Thus, each team member has a different perspective while observing the interview.   
 
As its primary purpose, a forensic interview is conducted to address the immediate health and 
welfare of the child.51 In this process, the interviewer will determine whether abuse or neglect 
happened;  obtain information from the child; establish rapport between the interviewer and the 
child (to provide comfort and security to the child when disclosing difficult information); and use 
age appropriate questions that neither suggests information to the child nor offers leading 
questions that offer the answer to the child.  Most trained professionals who conduct forensic 
interviews of children are governmental agents employed by the state, either as police officers, 
child protection service workers, or social workers.  Although some forensic interviewers are 
employed by privately-owned organizations or child advocacy centers and would likely not be 
deemed a governmental agent for purposes of the first prong of Crawford,52 these individuals are 
in the minority across the country. 
 
51 For example, Minnesota law sets forth that upon receiving a complaint of child abuse, “[t]he agency 
responsible for assessing or investigating reports of child maltreatment has the authority to interview the child, the 
person or persons responsible for the child's care, the alleged perpetrator, and any other person with knowledge of 
the abuse or neglect for the purpose of gathering the facts, assessing safety and risk to the child, and formulating a 
plan.” Minn. Stat. §626.556(3)(d).  In addressing the immediate health and welfare of the child, “[i]f the report 
alleges neglect, physical abuse, or sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, or individual functioning within the family 
unit as a person responsible for the child's care, the local welfare agency shall immediately conduct a family 
assessment or investigation as identified in clauses (1) to (4). In conducting a family assessment or investigation, the 
local welfare agency shall gather information on the existence of substance abuse and domestic violence and offer 
services for purposes of preventing future child maltreatment, safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused 
or neglected minor, and supporting and preserving family life whenever possible. If the report alleges a violation of 
a criminal statute involving sexual abuse, physical abuse, or neglect or endangerment, under section 609.378, the 
local law enforcement agency and local welfare agency shall coordinate the planning and execution of their 
respective investigation and assessment efforts to avoid a duplication of fact-finding efforts and multiple 
interviews.”   §626.556(10)(a)(4).  Michigan law sets forth, “In the course of its investigation, the department shall 
determine if the child is abused or neglected. The department shall cooperate with law enforcement officials, courts 
of competent jurisdiction, and appropriate state agencies providing human services in relation to preventing, 
identifying, and treating child abuse and neglect; shall provide, enlist, and coordinate the necessary services, directly 
or through the purchase of services from other agencies and professions; and shall take necessary action to prevent 
further abuses, to safeguard and enhance the child's welfare, and to preserve family life where possible.   MCL § 
722.628(2). 
 
52 See, e.g. People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
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IV.  COURTS ARE INACCURATELY ANALYZING CRAWFORD IN RELATION TO 
YOUNG WITNESSES 
 
A.  Forensic Interviews Have Been Negatively Impacted by Post-Crawford Courts
From the three core classifications outlined in the Crawford opinion as to what might constitute a 
testimonial statement, the following two-prong test is best in line with the intent of the Crawford 
decision,53 as well as for vulnerable victims, such as children, to determine whether an out-of-
court hearsay statement of a non-testifying witness is testimonial:   
 
• First, was a governmental agent involved in creating testimony or taking a formalized 
statement of a witness? 
• Second, would an objective witness in the declarant’s position reasonably believe that 
the statement would later be used in trial? 
 
Courts have primarily focused on the first prong of the analysis and have spent little time 
addressing the second prong as to whether young children can reasonably understand that their 
statements might be used in trial.  However, since mid-2005, courts began to assess the second 
prong in relation to young children.  In looking at the three classifications outlined by the 
Crawford court, a forensic interview of a young child54 should never be deemed testimonial.   
 
The “primary purpose” test discussed in Davis/Hammon focuses on the objective purpose of the 
law enforcement investigator and appears to contradict the objective person test which focuses 
on what is reasonable to the declarant.  Much discussion was held in the prosecution, legal and 
academic communities immediately following the Davis/Hammon decision on the survival of the 
objective person test.  Although Crawford, Davis and Hammon are open to wide interpretation, 
what is clear is that arguing the objective person test after Davis/Hammon is still viable. 
As in Crawford, the Davis/Hammon Court continued to focus on “[a]n accuser who makes a 
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”55 In spite of the “primary purpose” test focusing on 
the mind-set of the interrogator, the court noted Confrontation Clause issues are always focused 
on the declarant and not the interviewer.  Nonetheless, when admitting the out-of-court statement 
of a child victim, the factors to understand are twofold:  first, most child abuse victims do not 
immediately disclose the crime thus taking their initial disclosure out of the “primary purpose” 
scenarios set forth in Davis/Hammon; and second, children are never, under any circumstances, 
subjected to an interrogation as outlined in Davis/Hammon. Therefore, the “testimonial” 
guidelines set forth in Davis/Hammon should not apply in a child abuse case and should be 
clearly distinguished as such for the court to properly rule. 
 
53 See, also, State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
54 For purposes of this article, “young child” means a child age ten years old or under. 
 
55 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *19. 
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When analyzing a forensic interview within the core classifications outlined in Crawford, a
forensic interview does not fall within any classification.  First, a forensic interview of a young 
child is not ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent such as an affidavit, a 
custodial examinations prior testimony, or any similar pretrial statement that the child would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.  Statements made during a forensic interview are 
not formalized to the extent of courtroom testimony.  They are also not the equivalent of 
interrogation.  Those formally trained in forensic interviewing, particularly the R.A.T.A.C.™ are 
taught to ask open ended questions and focused questions to allow the child to provide a 
statement in his or her own words.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines interrogation as “the formal 
or systematic questioning of a person; esp. intensive questioning by the policy, usually of a 
person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime.”56 The definition further provides, 
“The Supreme Court has held that … interrogation includes not only express questioning but also 
words or actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
statement.”  Children who are asked open-ended questions during a forensic interview are not 
interrogated for purposes of obtaining incriminating statements.  These children are alleged to 
have been abused and are not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing.  No court should equate a 
forensic interview conducted by a police officer to that of interrogating a suspect. 
 
Second, a forensic interview of a young child is not formalized testimonial material such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions as outlined in Crawford.57 Again, when 
looking to the purpose of these formalized pre-trial statements, it is clearly understood by an 
objective declarant that the statements may later be used in court.  Many forensic interviews are 
now conducted at Child Advocacy Centers (CAC) throughout the country.  The National 
Children’s Advocacy Center, the first CAC created in the country, defines a CAC model as, “a 
child-focused, facility-based program in which representatives from many disciplines -- law 
enforcement, child protection, prosecution, mental health, medical and victim advocacy - work 
together, conducting joint forensic interviews and making team decisions about the investigation, 
treatment, management and prosecution of child abuse cases. CACs are community-based 
programs designed to meet the unique needs of a community, so no two CACs look exactly 
alike. They share a core philosophy that child abuse is a multifaceted community problem and no 
single agency, individual or discipline has the necessary knowledge, skills or resources to serve 
the needs of all children and their families. They also share a belief that the combined wisdom 
and professional knowledge of professionals of different disciplines will result in a more 
complete understanding of case issues and the most effective, child and family-focused system 
response.  The primary goal of all CACs is to ensure that children are not further victimized by 
the intervention systems designed to protect them.”58 
56 Black’s Law Dictionary 838 (8th ed. 1999). 
 
57 Crawford, 514 U.S. at 52. 
 
58 The National Children’s Advocacy Center Web Site is available at 
http://www.nationalcac.org/professionals/model/cac_model.html. 
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When a child, particularly under the age of ten, is at a child-friendly CAC59 or in a child-friendly 
interview room at another location60, an objective child would not be able to independently 
process that their statements might later be used in court.   
 
Third, a forensic interview of a child does not involve interrogation; it involves interviewing the 
child in a non-suggestive manner.  An interrogation by any definition involves a systematic and 
accusatory method of questioning an individual, most often a suspect.  The interrogator primarily 
dominates the session through structured questioning.  An interview, on the other hand, involves 
a non-accusatory meeting for information gathering by two people.  The interviewee primarily 
speaks during this session with the interviewer using open-ended questioning to avoid any issues 
with suggestible questions.  As such, the “primary purpose” test outlined in Davis/Hammon will 
not apply to forensic interviews since children are “interviewed” and not “interrogated.”61 
Fourth, a forensic interview of a young child does not contain statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness in the declarant’s position to reasonably 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.  As discussed later, children 
do not understand the court process and, particularly under the age of ten, will not have the 
cognitive ability or maturity to independently comprehend that their statement may later be used 
in court.  Nonetheless, many courts have focused solely on whether the interviewer is a 
governmental agent and, if so, have declared the interview testimonial solely on that factor.  This 
limited analysis does not fully address all the formulations laid out by the Crawford court. 
 
B.  Appellate Courts Across the Country are Issuing Conflicting Rulings as to whether Child 
Statements are Testimonial or Non-Testimonial.
1. Child Abuse Cases Ruling that Child Statements are Testimonial
The cases cited next involve child abuse prosecutions that proceeded to trial without the child’s 
testimony.  These cases are outlined to demonstrate how courts are addressing the governmental 
agent factor yet are failing to properly address the reasonable expectation factor for the child.  
These cases validate how courtroom doors are being shut to young children who are unable to 
testify in court due to trauma or youthfulness, and that statements made by our youngest 
members of society are being discounted while offenders are able to evade criminal conviction 
for choosing our youngest children to victimize. 
 
59 “At the Children's Advocacy Center, the various members of the child protection, law enforcement, 
prosecution, victim advocacy, medical and mental health communities were able to provide children and their 
families comprehensive services within a child-friendly environment designed to meet the child's needs. Prior to this 
effort, investigation and intervention into these serious cases of child maltreatment had been sporadic and without a 
common sense of duty and purpose.”  See, National Children’s Alliance Web site at http://www.nca-online.org.
60 Many police stations and school settings have created child-friendly rooms where children can be asked 
about alleged abuse or neglect.  This is done in order to create a non-threatening and supportive environment for the 
child. 
 
61 See the American Prosecutors Research Institute’s Finding Words:  Interviewing Children and Preparing 
for Court training program. 
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In State v. Hooper,62 statements made by a six-year-old victim to a nurse were found to be 
testimonial.  The child was interviewed at a child advocacy center by a nurse practitioner.  The 
Idaho Court of Appeals applied the Davis/Hammon primary purpose test to determine whether 
the child’s forensic interview was properly admitted in court since the child did not testify due to 
fear.  The application of the “primary purpose” test was inaccurate since that test applies to law 
enforcement interrogations and this particular interview involved a nurse practitioner.  The Court 
found that the child’s interview was testimonial and, therefore, improperly admitted at trial.  The 
Court provided the following reasoning: 
 
Turning to the case before us, it cannot be seriously disputed that the interview of 
A.H. by the STAR nurse bears far more similarity to the police interviews in 
Crawford and Hammon than to the 911 call at issue in Davis. A.H. gave her 
statement several hours after the alleged criminal event; it was not a plea for 
assistance in the face of an ongoing emergency, but a recitation of events that 
occurred earlier that day. A.H. was separated from the perpetrator in a safe, 
controlled environment and responded calmly to the questions. Although it would 
not have been a crime for A.H. to lie to the nurse, and the interview therefore 
lacked one of the formality components present in Hammon and Crawford, A.H.'s 
interview did have many trappings of formality, including structured questioning 
in a closed environment, supervision by a police officer, and recordation by 
videotape. Perhaps of greatest importance, the statement that A.H. gave was 
precisely the kind of statement that a witness would give on direct examination at 
trial. At the outset, the interviewer asked several preliminary questions to ensure 
that A.H. knew the difference between the truth and a lie, and asked A.H. to 
correct the interviewer if she said something inaccurate. These questions very 
much resemble the initial questions a prosecutor would ask when examining a 
child witness on the stand, and the substantive questioning that followed elicited 
the details of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator. A.H.'s statements in the 
interview "aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues.63 
* * *
In the present case, it is clear that the interviewer acted in concert with or at the 
behest of the police. The interviewing nurse described herself as a ‘forensic 
interviewer and sexual assault nurse examiner.’ Police directed the victim's 
mother to take her to the STAR Center, and an officer watched the interview from 
another room. Toward the end of the interview, the nurse inquired of the officer 
whether all the questions that the officer desired had been asked, and then 
returned to the interview room with several additional queries, apparently at the 
officer's instruction. In addition, the nurse testified that the purpose of the 
questioning was in preparation for trial and that she knew the interview would be 
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. There is no evidence that the interview 
had a diagnostic, therapeutic or medical purpose. The conclusion is inescapable 
 
62 No. 31025, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS 83 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). 
63 Hooper, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS at 11-13. 
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that the nurse was acting in tandem with law enforcement officers to gain 
evidence of past events potentially to be used in a later criminal prosecution.’64 
* * *
We conclude, however, that while these courts' analyses may have represented a 
reasonable interpretation of Crawford, they have been discredited by Davis,
which focuses not at all on the expectations of the declarant but on the content of 
the statement, the circumstances under which it was made, and the interrogator's 
purpose in asking questions.65 
The court’s analysis in Hooper is interesting as it takes the law enforcement interrogation limited 
imposed by Davis/Hammon to an exaggerated level and labeled the nurse practitioner as acting 
in concert with the police.  Although it is troubling that the nurse practitioner had no diagnostic, 
therapeutic or medical duties during this interview, thus making the nurse’s testimony fall 
outside the scope of the medical hearsay exception, the court went to great length’s to insure that 
the six-year-old child’s statements would be barred from the courtroom.    
 
Rangel v. Texas66 addressed forensic interview statements made by a four-year-old victim who 
was unable to testify due to trauma.  The prosecutor moved to admit the videotaped forensic 
interview of the child and the defendant was convicted.  On appeal, the court found the interview 
to be testimonial.   
 
Regardless of whether the four-year-old child may or may not have perceived 
when she made the statements that they could be used against appellant as 
evidence in a criminal case, the statute itself clearly contemplates that a child's 
statement admitted under article 38.071 will function as testimony in a criminal 
case. *** Thus, regardless of what C.R. thought her statements would be used for, 
they were clearly admitted at trial to function as testimony against appellant. 
Moreover, the structured, formalized questioning of C.R. by the investigator, 
whether sworn or unsworn, is more akin to the types of ex parte examination 
discussed and condemned in Crawford than a "casual remark to an acquaintance" 
or even to initial statements made to a police officer responding to a call. 
Furthermore, during the interview Cleveland stated that she was asking C.R. 
questions to make sure that "it" did not happen again. Regardless of whether C.R. 
understood the full extent to which her answers could be used, i.e., as testimony in 
a criminal prosecution of appellant, we believe, either under a subjective standard 
or an objective standard, that a four-year-old child would be able to perceive this 
as meaning that her words would be used to establish or prove some fact--i.e., that 
he sexually assaulted her--and that the establishment of that fact was necessary so 
 
64 Hooper, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS at  14-15. 
 
65 Hooper, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS at 18. 
 
66 Hooper, 199 S.W.3d 523  (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
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that a person in authority, whether the investigator or someone else, would make 
appellant stop.67 
The court addressed what would be understood by a four-year-old child and, without any 
supporting evidence or research, concluded that a four-year-old would understand that her 
statement would be used to prove a fact and give a person of authority the ability to make the 
defendant stop.  It is clear that court imposed its own adult cognitive abilities in place of what an 
objective four-year-old child, or this four-year-old child, would reasonably understand.   
 
In North Dakota v. Blue,68 a four-year-old child was interviewed at a Child Advocacy Center 
while a police officer watched the interview from a television in a different room.  Although the 
child had been present at a preliminary examination where she sat on her mother’s lap and 
answered certain questions, the child was unavailable to testify at trial and the videotaped 
interview was admitted in to evidence.  The court determined that the statements made by the 
child at the interview were testimonial for the reason that her statements were made “with police 
involvement. Statements made to non-government questioners acting in concert with or as an 
agent of the government are likely testimonial statements under Crawford.”69 The court failed to 
consider what the child understood during the interview about her statements potentially being 
needed for court. 
In D.G.B. v. State,70 a juvenile defendant was charged with molesting a six-year-old victim.  At 
trial, the forensic interview of the victim was introduced as the victim did not testify due to 
trauma. The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that the forensic interview was testimonial 
under Crawford since the interview was conducted by a police officer attempting to gather 
evidence of a crime.  The court failed to conduct an analysis of whether the six year old child 
understood that the statements made at the forensic interview might later be used in court. 
 
In State v. Mack,71 the trial court ruled that a social worker, who took over a forensic interview 
started by a police officer, was a governmental agent and was serving as a proxy for the police 
when finishing the interview of the three-year-old witness.  In a pre-trial ruling several days after 
the issuance of the Crawford decision, the trial court found that the child was incompetent to 
testify.  The court further found that the social worker was eliciting statements from the child so 
that the police could videotape the interview for the investigation.  As a result, the forensic 
interview was declared testimonial and was not admissible due to the child’s incompetency to 
testify.  On appeal, the prosecution asked the court to look at the child’s intent in making 
 
67 199 S.W.3d 523 . 
 
68 717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006). 
 
69 2006 N.D. LEXIS 143 at *13-14.    
70 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 1584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
71 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004).  See also, People v. T.T. (In re T.T.), 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004) (statements made by the child to a Illinois Department of Children and Family Services investigator 
and police officer were deemed testimonial due to their status as governmental agents). 
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statements during the forensic interview.  Unfortunately, the child’s intent in making statements 
is not the factor outlined in Crawford; rather, whether the child could reasonably expect her 
statements to later be used in court is the proper analysis.  Thus, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
failed to address whether the three-year-old child understood that the statements might later be 
utilized prosecutorially. 
 
The employment status of a police officer was addressed in People v. R.F.72 This case involved 
a three-year-old victim who was interviewed by a police officer subsequent to making 
disclosures of sexual abuse to her mom and grandmother.  At trial, all statements made by the 
child were admitted without the child testifying.  These statements were admitted before the 
decision in Crawford was announced.  The defendant was convicted and on appeal he raised a 
Crawford violation.  Although the court properly ruled that statements made to family were non-
testimonial, the court found that the forensic interview was testimonial because the officer “was 
acting in an investigative capacity for the purposes of producing evidence in anticipation of a 
criminal prosecution when he questioned [the child].”73 The Illinois Court of Appeals noted the 
language regarding the reasonable expectations of the declarant when making out-of-court 
statements, yet failed to analyze what an objective witness in the three-year-old victim’s position 
would reasonably understand when making the statement.  The defendant’s conviction was 
upheld in spite of the violation which was deemed harmless error in light of other evidence of his 
guilt. 
 
T.P. v. State74 addressed Alabama’s Tender Years statute which provides for hearsay statements 
of children under age twelve to be admitted at trial if the child testifies or if the child is found to 
be unavailable.  The eight-year-old child victim was deemed unavailable to testify due to a 
finding of emotional trauma by the court.  Statements by the child during a forensic interview 
conducted by a police investigator and witnessed by a social services worker were admitted at 
trial. The defendant was convicted and while his appeal was pending, the Crawford decision was 
issued.  The Alabama Court of Appeals found that the forensic interview was intended as an 
investigative tool for a potential criminal prosecution, thus being similar to a police 
interrogation, and therefore fell within the definition of "testimonial."  Again, the court did not 
address whether the eight-year-old child reasonably expected that his statement could later be 
used in court. 
 
In People ex rel. R.A.S.,75 a juvenile defendant was convicted of molesting a four-year-old child.  
The child disclosed the abuse to his mother and then during a videotaped forensic interview with 
a trained police officer.  At trial, the child was available to testify at a competency hearing, but 
the hearing was not held due to a stipulation between the attorneys that the child was too young 
to be competent to testify.  As a result, the court permitted the child’s statements to his mother to 
be admitted, as well as the videotaped forensic interview.  Crawford was decided while this case 
 
72 825 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005) 
 
73 R.F.,825 N.E.2d at 295. 
 
74 911 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) 
 
75 111 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) 
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was pending on appeal.  The Colorado Court of Appeals applied Crawford and found that the 
statements by the child to the police officer were testimonial and investigative in nature. The 
court did not address whether the child victim could reasonably expect her statements to later be 
used in court and the court was not asked to make a finding of incompetency due to the 
stipulation.  Although the juvenile defendant stipulated that the child was incompetent to testify, 
the defendant did not waive his confrontation rights within that stipulation.  The court found that 
the defendant only waived unavailability of the child to testify and did not waive the right to 
confront the child.  The hearsay statements to the mother were not addressed on appeal.  The 
conviction in this case was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial in light of 
Crawford.
In addressing interviewers who are employed for privately funded child welfare centers, the 
court in People v. Geno76 held that the director of a non-governmental Children’s Assessment 
Center was not a governmental employee.  Although Child Protective Services, a state agency, 
arranged for the interview, this did not impact on the court’s decision.  The court held that “the 
child's answer to the question of whether she had an ‘owie’ was not a statement in the nature of 
‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent’.”77 
One case that addressed whether a young child could reasonably understand that statements 
made in the forensic interview would be used in trial is People v. Vigil.78 The defendant was 
charged and convicted of having sexually assaulted the seven-year-old son of a co-worker in the 
co-worker's home.  At trial, the child's father testified that he witnessed the defendant leaning 
over his child and both were partially undressed.  When the defendant fled the home, the child 
was frightened and confused but disclosed anal penetration.  The child also disclosed to his 
father's friend that his "butt hurt."  A police officer completed a videotaped interview with the 
child.  Portions of the videotaped interviewed were played at trial after the child was found 
incompetent to testify.  The Colorado Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and ruled that 
the videotaped statement by the child was testimonial and violated Crawford.
We conclude that the videotaped statement given by the child to the police 
officer in this case was "testimonial" under the Crawford formulations of that 
concept. In so concluding, we reject the People's argument that the statement 
could not be considered testimonial because it was not made during the course 
of police interrogation and because a seven-year-old child would not 
reasonably expect his statements to be used prosecutorially. ***  The police 
officer who conducted the interview had had extensive training in the 
particular interrogation techniques required for interviewing children. At the 
outset of the interview, she told the child she was a police officer, and, after 
ascertaining that the child knew the difference between being truthful and 
lying, she told him he needed to tell the truth. Thus, the absence of an oath, 
 
76 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 2004) 
 
77 Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692. 
 
78 104 P.3d 258 (Colo. 2004); rev’d in part 127 P.3d  916 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 2006).   
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which in any event is not a requirement under Crawford for police 
interrogations, did not preclude the child's statements from being testimonial. 
***  Nor can the statements be characterized as non-testimonial on the basis 
that a seven-year-old child would not reasonably expect them to be used 
prosecutorially. During the interview, the police officer asked the child what 
should happen to defendant, and the child replied that defendant should go to 
jail. The officer then told the child that he would need to talk to "a friend" of 
hers who worked for the district attorney and who was going to try to put 
defendant "in jail for a long long time." This discussion, together with the 
interviewer's emphasis at the outset regarding the need to be truthful, would 
indicate to an objective person in the child's position that the statements were 
intended for use at a later proceeding that would lead to punishment of 
defendant.79 
Based on the nature of the interview and statements made the seven-year-old child, it is 
understandable how the court would deem the statement to be testimonial.  The court analyzed 
what a child of that age would understand and, based on what the detective told the child, the 
child understood that his statements might be used in court or, at a minimum, to put the offender 
in jail.  However, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
regard to the child’s statements to the emergency room physician.  The Court held that 
statements made by the same child to the emergency room physician were non-testimonial, and 
outlined a reasonable child standard in its reasoning; however, they affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that the statement by the child during the forensic interview was testimonial.  What is 
important to note about the forensic interview in Vigil is that many of the tactics and statements 
made by the trained police officer are not recommended, especially during a RATAC interview.   
 
In Snowden v. State,80 the Maryland Supreme Court ruled that forensic interviews of children 
ages eight and ten, conducted by a child protective services worker, were testimonial and would 
require testimony by the children at trial in order to admit the videotaped forensic interview.  In 
its opinion, the court found that the CPS worker was a governmental agent.  Although the 
victims were young, the court found that they were aware that their statements were being taken 
because the police were involved.  The Maryland Supreme Court imposed an objective ordinary 
person standard on these child victims, pointed out that the interviews were conducted at a 
county-owned facility, and that the purpose of the CPS worker conducting the interview was to 
gather evidence for prosecution.  However, the court did acknowledge that some children may 
not understand the purpose of a forensic interview and said, “Although we recognize that there 
may be situations where a child may be so young or immature that he or she would be unable to 
understand the testimonial nature of his or her statements, we are unwilling to conclude that, as a 
matter of law, young children's statements cannot possess the same testimonial nature as those of 
other, more clearly competent declarants.”  The Court came to that conclusion regarding children 
without any supporting research or evidence from these particular victims, or objective children 
in their position.   
 
79 Vigil, 104 P. 3d 258, 262-263.   
 
80 867 A.2d 314 (Md.  2005) 
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Lastly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the Davis/Hammon “primary purpose” test to 
statements made by a seven-year-old victim to a nurse practitioner.  In State v. Krasky,81 the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed its prior ruling where the court held, “although the MCRC 
examination may have been arranged by Detective Manuel and a child-protection worker, there 
is no indication that T.L.K. thought that her statements might be used in a later trial.”82 On 
rehearing, the court reversed itself and found that the child’s statement were testimonial basedon 
the “primary purpose” of the interview and specifically refused to address what a child would 
understand.  This was an improper application of the Davis/Hammon rule. 
 
The decisions discussed in this section demonstrate the difficulty of trial and appellate courts in 
applying an undefined and unworkable test from Crawford, Davis and Hammon.   Thus, child 
victims who are too traumatized or too young to testify are being denied a fundamental right as a 
victim to be heard in court.   
 
2. Appellate Courts that Addressed the Objective Declarant Prong of Crawford in Relation 
to Children:  The Proper and Improper Applications of the Objective Reasonable Declarant
Approximately one year after the issuance of Crawford, some courts began to apply the new rule 
of Crawford in a manner that reflected what children understand about the nature of their 
statements.  In doing so, many of these courts acknowledged that young children, particularly 
under the age of ten, do not think like an adult or cognitively process information like an adult.  
This analysis is difficult for many judges, like child abuse cases in general, due to lack of 
training on child witnesses and how to handle cases involving young victims.83 Therefore, when 
addressing the objective reasonable person standard of Crawford, the question becomes:  What is 
objectively reasonable for a person of the age of the child? 
 
The first post-Crawford case to address the abilities of a child witness came in State v. Dezee.84 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that nothing in the record supported the conclusion that 
the nine-year-old child reasonably believed the statements to her mother could or would be 
available for use in a trial. 
 
81 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
82 Krasky, 696 N.W. 2d at 820. 
 
83 For further discussion, see Victor I. Vieth, Unto the Third Generation: A Call to End Child Abuse in the 
United States Within 120 Years (revised and expanded), 25 HAMLINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY  
(forthcoming 2007) where he cites “A recent survey of 2,240 judges found that barely 50% of them had received 
any child welfare training before hearing child dependency and neglect proceedings. View from the Bench: 
Obstacles to Safety & Permanency for Children in Foster Care (July 2004) (this survey was conducted by the 
Children & Family Research Center, School of Social Work, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and is 
available on line at www.fosteringresults.org.” 
 
84 No. 51521-7-I, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 104 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  
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The next decision, in May 2005, showed the Ohio Court of Appeal’s acknowledgement of what a 
reasonable child understands about court.  In re D.L.85 involved a juvenile defendant who was 
found delinquent for engaging in sexual conduct with his three-year-old cousin.  The victim was 
found incompetent to testify at trial.  The social worker who interviewed the child testified that 
the victim gave great detail similar to the disclosure that was given to her mother.  The victim 
was taken to the hospital and given a physical exam.  The exam revealed nothing.  However, the 
pediatric nurse practitioner concluded that abuse was probable, based on the victim's description 
of events. The victim's statements to the practitioner were held non-testimonial and properly 
admitted under the medical history hearsay exception despite the ruling that the victim was not 
competent to testify.  There was no evidence to show that the nurse practitioner was working on 
behalf of, or in conjunction with, investigating police officers for the purpose of developing the 
case against the defendant.  The nurse took statements from the victim to evaluate how likely it 
was that she had been abused and to determine what laboratory tests and medical treatment 
might be needed.  The nurse further considered information from the victim's medical history to 
aid her in making her assessment and conducted a physical evaluation of the victim. There was 
no evidence that the victim was interviewed for the express purpose of developing her testimony 
for use at trial.  The court went on to say “[o]ur review of the record shows no circumstances to 
indicate the victim, or a reasonable child of her age, would have believed her statements were for 
anything other than for medical treatment.”86 The court further held, “because an incompetency 
ruling is a declaration that the witness is incapable of understanding an oath, or liable to give an 
incoherent statement as to the subject and cannot properly communicate to the jury, it does not 
make for a conclusion that all out-of-court statements are per se inadmissible when a witness is 
declared incompetent.  This may be particularly true in the case of young children. Simply 
because a child is deemed incompetent for purposes of testifying does not make the child's 
statements per se inadmissible.”87 
As previously discussed, the Maryland Supreme Court in State v. Snowden88 addressed the 
forensic interview statements of two child victims of sexual abuse (ages 8 and 10).  The children 
did not testify at trial, but the CPS worker who interviewed the children testified to the 
statements made during the interview.   
 
Using these objective standards in the present case, it is clear that an ordinary 
person in the position of any of the declarants would have anticipated the sense 
that her statements to the sexual abuse investigator potentially would have been 
used to "prosecute" Snowden. The interview questions posed by Wakeel, and the 
responses elicited, were in every way the functional equivalent of the formal 
police questioning discussed in Crawford as a prime example of what may be 
considered testimonial. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364-65, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177. 
 
85 2005 Ohio 2320 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 
86 In re D.L., 2005 Ohio 2320 at P20. 
 
87 In re D.L., 2005 Ohio 2320 at P28. 
 
88 867 A.2d 314 (Md.  2005). 
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* * *
During Wakeel's interviews, each child also stated that she was aware of the 
purpose of the questioning, and through each of her answers indicated that she 
was aware of the illegal (or at least morally or ethically wrong) nature of the 
touching attributed to Snowden. This awareness of the prosecutorial purpose of 
the interviews not only satisfies any objective formulation of what is 
"testimonial," but, in our opinion, demonstrates that the children actually were 
aware that their statements had the potential to be used against Snowden in an 
effort to hold him accountable for his conduct.89 
The court imposed an objective ordinary person standard on these child victims, pointed out that 
the interviews were conducted at a county-owned facility, and that the purpose of the CPS 
worker conducting the interview was to gather evidence for prosecution.  The Court went on to 
hold: 
 
We find that where an objective person in the position of the declarant would be 
aware that the statement-taker is an agent of the government, governmental 
involvement is a relevant, and indeed weighty, factor in determining whether any 
statements made would be deemed testimonial in nature.   
 
*** 
 
Although we recognize that there may be situations where a child may be so 
young or immature that he or she would be unable to understand the 
testimonial nature of his or her statements, we are unwilling to conclude that, as a 
matter of law, young children's statements cannot possess the same testimonial 
nature as those of other, more clearly competent declarants.90 
The Snowden Court reached these conclusions based solely on the conduct and questions 
of the interviewer, and failed to address child development research or what a child 
would understand about the later use of her statement.  This analysis is inaccurate when 
following the core classifications outlined in Crawford. 
 
In Lagunas v. State,91 a four-year-old child witnessed the defendant killing her mother.  The 
child was unable to testify at trial; however, the court allowed the child’s statements to be 
admitted.   On appeal, the court held that the child's age and her emotional state were factors in 
determining that her statements to the officer were non-testimonial. 
 
89 Snowden, 867 A2d  at 325-26. 
 
90 Snowden, 867 A2d at 328-29. 
 
91 187 S.W.3d 503  (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
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In September 2005, the Military Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the statements of a two-
year-old child in United States v. Coulter.92 The two year old child spontaneously disclosed to 
her parents that she had been touched by defendant.  These statements were held non-testimonial 
because the statements to her parents were not the type of testimonial statements outlined in 
Crawford. Moreover, “[a]t the same time, the circumstances under which this two-year-old 
declarant made her statements would not lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the 
statements would be available for use at a later trial. Two-year-old [victim] could no more 
appreciate the possible future uses of her statements than she could understand the significance 
of what she was communicating.”93 
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in People v. Sharp,94 held that a five-year-old child abuse victim 
could not appreciate the consequences of her statements during a forensic interview.  In a well-
reasoned decision that focused on the reasonable expectation prong, the court stated: 
 
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his five-year-old daughter. The 
mother testified that when the child returned from a visit with defendant, she 
reported that defendant had touched her inappropriately. At trial, the prosecution 
attempted to have the child testify, but after it became apparent she was too 
traumatized to testify, the trial court found her unavailable as a witness. At that 
time, portions of the child's videotaped interview were shown to the jury. The 
appellate court found that defendant was entitled to seek relief under the U.S. 
Supreme Court Crawford decision, and ruled that defendant's confrontation rights 
were not violated by introduction of the child's videotaped statement at trial. A 
private forensic interviewer questioned the child outside the presence of police 
and district attorneys, using casual, open-ended questions. The child did not make 
any statement indicating that she understood the consequences of her statements. 
In short, there was no indication in the record that the child was aware of the 
reason for her interview. An objective person in the child's position would not 
believe her statements would lead to punishment of defendant. 
State v. Blount95 analyzed the statements of a three-year-old victim who was sexually abused by 
her mother’s boyfriend and informed four people of the assault (her grandmother, a friend, and 
two counselors).  The child was unable to testify at trial, but the statements to the four people 
were admitted.  On appeal, the statements to the two counselors were in issue and held to be non-
testimonial.   
 
We hold, considering the surrounding circumstances, that a reasonable child in 
the victim's position would have no reason to know or believe her statements 
would be used in a subsequent trial.  The victim was referred to Meadows, then a 
 
92 62 M.J. 520 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005). 
 
93 Coulter, 62 M.J. at *24. 
 
94 No.: 04CA0619, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 1761 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
95 No. COA05-134, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2606 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
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counselor at a private, non-profit child counseling center, by Department of Social 
Services social worker Angela Beasley. Meadows testified that in her sessions the 
child is never encouraged to disclose abuse, but is given the opportunity to do so 
in an environment where she feels secure enough to speak freely. Meadows 
testified that not all children disclose any abuse. There is no evidence in the 
record that Meadows ever discussed the potential for any criminal consequences 
for defendant. There is no evidence that Meadows ever discussed with the victim 
any potential punishment for the defendant.  Roberts is a therapist in Dare 
County. The victim was referred to Roberts for follow up counseling after her 
sessions with Meadows, and at the time of trial had participated in approximately 
forty sessions with Roberts. Roberts testified that she assured the victim that their 
conversations were confidential, and that Roberts could not disclose their 
conversations to anyone. There is no evidence in the record that the victim was 
made aware in any way that her statements could be used against defendant for 
prosecution, or that Roberts ever discussed any potential consequences to 
defendant. In fact, review of the entire record reveals no evidence that the victim 
was ever made to understand by anyone that defendant could face criminal trial 
and punishment as a result of what he had done to her.  The victim was three or 
four years old when she made her first statements to Meadows and Roberts 
implicating defendant (the record does not include the child's date of birth, but she 
was five at the time of the trial, and first spoke with Meadows and Roberts some 
fourteen months previously). It is "highly implausible" that a three or four year 
old would have reason to know, nor even understand, that her statements might 
be used in a later trial. (emphasis added)96 
In contrast, Flores v. State97 addressed what a five-year-old witness understands for purposes of 
the reasonable expectation standard.  The case proceeded to trial prior to announcement of the 
new rule of Crawford. The five-year-old victim (Zoraida) was abused by her step mother and 
ultimately died from blunt force trauma to the head.  The biological daughter (Sylvia) of the 
defendant witnessed the attack and told her foster mom (Ms. Diaz).  Sylvia was declared 
unavailable to testify due to trauma.  Statements she made to a child abuse investigator Durgin 
and CPS Investigator Goodman were introduced at trial pursuant to a state hearsay statute that 
followed Idaho v Wright.98 In addressing the three formulations of what might be deemed 
 
96 Blount,  2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2606 at *11-13. 
 
97 120 P.3d 1170 (Nev. 2005). 
98 NRS 51.385 tracks the Idaho v. Wright model: 
1. In addition to any other provision for admissibility made by statute or rule of court, a statement 
made by a child under the age of 10 years describing any act of sexual conduct performed with or 
on the child or any act of physical abuse of the child is admissible in a criminal proceeding 
regarding that act of sexual conduct or physical abuse if: 
(a) The court finds, in a hearing out of the presence of the jury, that the time, content and 
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; and 
(b) The child testifies at the proceeding or is unavailable or unable to testify. 
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testimonial statements as outlined in Crawford, the court held that Sylvia’s statements do not 
meet the first or second formulation.  However, the court found that: 
 
[G]iven Sylvia's age and relationship to Flores, it is unlikely that she intended to 
testify through the surrogates or that she "reasonably expected" that the 
statements would be used criminally against her mother. *** We conclude, 
however, that two of Sylvia's statements were "testimonial" under the third 
illustration, as they were statements that, under the circumstances of their making, 
"'would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial.'" Under the third illustration the Court 
impliedly establishes a "reasonable person" test for when a declarant has made a 
testimonial statement. Applying this third test, we conclude that the statements to 
Durgin and Godman were clearly testimonial under Crawford because both were 
either police operatives or were tasked with reporting instances of child abuse for 
prosecution. ***  With regard to the child's statements to Ms. Diaz, we conclude 
that these statements, which were spontaneously made at home while Ms. Diaz 
was caring for the child, were not such that a reasonable person would anticipate 
their use for prosecutorial purposes.”   
 
The Nevada Supreme Court incorrectly addressed the “reasonable person” standard from the 
duties and intentions of the police officer and the CPS Investigator.  There was no analysis given 
from what the five-year-old witness understood in regard to how her statement might later be 
used.  Although such an analysis might arguably be proper under the Davis/Hammon “primary 
purpose” rule, that decision had not been issued at the time. 
 
North Carolina v. Brigman99 explained that “[w]e cannot conclude that a reasonable child under 
three years of age would know or should know that his statements might later be used at a trial. 
Therefore, we hold [the child’s] statement to Dr. Conroy was not testimonial, and defendant's 
right to confrontation was not violated.”100 Similarly, Miller v. Fleming101 followed the 
reasoning from Colorado v. Vigil and found that an objective seven-year-old would not 
understand that statements made to a medical professional would later be used in court.  Thus, 
 
2. In determining the trustworthiness of a statement, the court shall consider, without limitation, 
whether: 
(a) The statement was spontaneous; 
(b) The child was subjected to repetitive questioning; 
(c) The child had a motive to fabricate; 
(d) The child used terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and 
(e) The child was in a stable mental state. 
 
99 629 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
100 Brigman, 629 S.E.2d  at 317. 
 
101 No. C04-1289P,  2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17284 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
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those statements were deemed non-testimonial.  In re A. J. A.102 similarly concluded that a 
reasonable 5-year-old would not expect her statements to a nurse to later be used in court. 
Kansas v. Henderson103 held that an interview of a three-year-old child abuse victim was 
testimonial for the reason that the interview was conducted by child protection agencies in 
conjunction with law enforcement officials.  The child was unable to testify due to competency 
issues as a result of her age.  The prosecution argued a subjective reasonable witness standard 
from the point of this particular child.  The Kansas Court of Appeals refused to accept this 
argument and held, “The State seizes upon the "reasonably expect to be used prosecutorily" 
phrase and argues that as a 3-year-old, F.J.I. could not reasonably believe her statements would 
be used at trial. If we were to adopt this standard, we would decide a serious constitutional issue 
based on the subjective intent of the declarant or on a "reasonable child" standard. Neither choice 
is logical or provides the more certain result that Crawford seems to require or that was found 
lacking under Roberts. “104 The Crawford Court did not provide a subjective reasonable person 
standard; instead, the Court set forth an objective witness standard, to wit:  What would be 
reasonable to an objective person in the declarant’s position?  Because the Kansas Court of 
Appeals only addressed the child’s statements from a subjective standard, the court rejected that 
argument.  The court did not, sua sponte, address the objective reasonable person test set forth in 
Crawford and, therefore, ruled that the statement by the three-year-old child was testimonial.   
Rangel v. State,105 inaccurately addressed the objective reasonable person prong in regard to a 
four-year-old victim.  “[D]uring the interview [the interviewer] stated that she was asking C.R. 
questions to make sure that ‘it’ did not happen again. Regardless of whether C.R. understood the 
full extent to which her answers could be used, i.e., as testimony in a criminal prosecution of 
appellant, we believe, either under a subjective standard or an objective standard, that a four-
year-old child would be able to perceive this as meaning that her words would be used to 
establish or prove some fact--i.e., that he sexually assaulted her--and that the establishment of 
that fact was necessary so that a person in authority, whether the investigator or someone else, 
would make appellant stop.”  Again, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that the four-year-
old appreciated the nature of her statements without the benefit of research validating what a 
four-year-old understands about court, or what this particular child understood at the time of her 
statement. 
 
As previously discussed, the decision of People v. Vigil106 accurately outlines the position of a 
child when giving statements of abuse and acknowledges that a reasonable child standard is 
appropriate. The Colorado Supreme Court held in Vigil that “(1) the circumstances under which 
the child made statements did not constitute the functional equivalent of police interrogation and 
 
102 No. A06-479, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 988 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
103 129 P.3d 646 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
104 Henderson, 129 P.3d  at 651. 
 
105 199 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
106 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006). 
 
- 30 - 
(2) an objectively reasonable child in the declarant's position would not have believed that his 
statements to the doctor or his statements to his father and his father's friend would be available 
for use at a later trial.”  In determining that statements of the seven-year-old child to a doctor 
were non-testimonial, the court provided the following reasoning: 
 
As the doctor testified at trial, his purpose in questioning the child was to 
determine whether the child would "say something that could help [the medical 
personnel] understand what the potential injuries were." The child's responses 
helped the doctor develop his opinion regarding whether a sexual assault had 
occurred and how best to treat the child. Thus, rather than being an agent of the 
police, the doctor's job involved identifying and treating sexual abuse. The fact 
that the doctor was a member of a child protection team does not, in and of itself, 
make him a government official absent a more direct and controlling police 
presence, such as the presence demonstrated in Mack, 337 Ore. 586, 101 P.3d 349 
(Or. 2004), and Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).  
*** 
We hold that the "objective witness" language in Crawford refers to an 
objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. Applying this test to the 
instant case, we determine that an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have believed that his statements to the doctor would be 
available for use at a later trial. 
*** 
[A]n objective seven-year-old child would reasonably be interested in feeling 
better and would intend his statements to describe the source of his pain and his 
symptoms. In addition, an objectively reasonable seven-year-old child would 
expect that a doctor would use his statements to make him feel better and to 
formulate a medical diagnosis. He would not foresee the statements being used in 
a later trial.  Thus, from the perspective of an objective witness in the child's 
position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the 
purpose of medical diagnosis, and not related to the criminal prosecution. No 
police officer was present at the time of the examination, nor was the examination 
conducted at the police department. The child, the doctor, and the child's mother 
were present in the examination room. 
 
Commonwealth v. DeOliveira107 involved a six-year-old victim who informed a social worker 
about sexual abuse.  The child was taken to the emergency room by police officers where she 
repeated her statements to the physician.  The child was unavailable to testify at trial; however, 
the physician testified to statements made by the child during the examination and stated that he 
works independent from the police and examined the child for injury and to determine 
appropriate medical care.  To assist the Massachusetts Supreme Court, this author filed an 
amicus brief addressing the child development research and what children understand about 
court.108 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the child's statement was not ‘testimonial 
per se’.   
 
107 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006). 
 
108 See, infra, Section V. 
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Police presence at a hospital cannot turn questioning of a patient by a physician 
during a medical examination into interrogation by law enforcement. We 
conclude that Patricia's statements to the doctor are not testimonial per se. That is, 
however, not the end of the analysis. Our Gonsalves decision also requires a 
careful assessment of all the circumstances in which a statement is made and an 
objective inquiry into "whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would anticipate the statement's being used against the accused in investigating 
and prosecuting a crime." Id. at 12-13. Logic informs that a six year old child can 
have little or no comprehension of a criminal prosecution in which the child's 
words might be introduced as evidence against another person in a court of law.109 
In addressing the statement from the child’s perspective, the court further held, “We have no 
difficulty concluding that, considering the circumstances, a reasonable person in Patricia's 
position, and armed with her knowledge, could not have anticipated that her statements might be 
used in a prosecution against the defendant. On this record, there is nothing to indicate that 
Patricia even recognized the criminality of the defendant's sexual contacts with her.”110 
Many of the courts listed above properly applied the factors outline in Crawford to determine 
whether the out-of-court statements by each child would be testimonial or not. However, the 
Maryland, Nevada and Texas courts failed to conduct a full or accurate analysis into the 
reasonable person standard as it relates to child forensic interviews and ended with a nonsensical 
and tragic result for those child victims.  When courts begin to recognize that the objective 
reasonable person standard is not an adult standard, and that the court can take into account the 
cognitive and mental abilities of the child, that will result in turning the tide of inaccurate 
decisions from the bench that is harming child victims and witnesses.  Understanding the child 
development research listed in the next Section will assist in making this difficult determination 
under Crawford..
V.  THE OBJECTIVE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD OF CRAWFORD: CHILDREN 
UNDER THE AGE OF TEN DO NOT UNDERSTAND COURT OR THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROCESS WHEN MAKING STATEMENTS REGARDING ABUSE 
 
The Crawford factor that has been least addressed by courts in determining whether a statement 
is testimonial is:  Would the declarant reasonably expect the statement to be used 
prosecutorially?  In essence, does a child understand that during a forensic interview, the 
statements he or she makes might later be used in a criminal prosecution?  Research has shown 
that young children do not understand what “court” is or how the criminal justice system 
operates and, therefore, are unable to understand that statements made in a forensic interview 
could be used in that forum.  “Testifying is anxiety-producing for most adult witnesses.  Adults, 
however, are sufficiently knowledgeable about the legal system to place their testimony in 
 
109 DeOliveia, 849 N.E.2d at 225. 
 
110 DeOliveia, 849 N.E.2d at 226. 
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context.  In general terms, adults understand what happens in court and what is expected of them.  
This knowledge helps adults manage the stress of testifying.  By contrast, many children have 
little idea of what to expect in court.  Some young children believe that they will go to jail if they 
give the ‘wrong answer,’ or that the defendant will yell at them.”111 Below are six of the 
foremost studies regarding children’s understanding of court.  These studies are important when 
addressing what a declarant understands when making accusatory statements to governmental 
agents. 
 
1989 Saywitz Study: “Children’s Conceptions of the Legal System”
Dr. Karen Saywitz published a study in 1989 that focused on developmental differences in 
children’s understanding of the legal system and what contributes to that understanding.112 
Children ages four to fourteen were divided into age groups.113 Half of the children were 
actively involved in court cases.  The study focused on eight court-related concepts:  “court,” 
“jury,” “judge,” “witness,” “lawyer,” “bailiff,” “court clerk,” and “court reporter.”  All the 
children were asked questions and shown illustrations of these eight concepts and asked to tell 
what they knew about the concept.  The terms “bailiff,” “court clerk” and “court reporter” were 
removed from the final results as the children overall had a poor understanding of those 
concepts.  Surprisingly, children with more actual court experience demonstrated less accurate 
and less complete knowledge than children with no court experience.  The researchers surmised 
this could be for two reasons.  First, children who were involved in court cases may have 
emotional difficulties that interfere with cognitive abilities because they were from dysfunctional 
families; and second, actual court experience for children may be confusing and chaotic, thus 
making accurate knowledge of the system more difficult.  The chart below demonstrates the 
percentage of children in each age group that showed accurate understanding of each of the eight 
concepts: 
 
Age Group  Age Group  Age Group 
Concept  4-7 years  8-11 years  12-14 years 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court   0.06% accurate 74% accurate  100% accurate 
Jury   0% accurate  21% accurate  73% accurate 
Judge   0.06% accurate 93% accurate  91% accurate 
Witness  0.11% accurate 86% accurate  100% accurate  
Lawyer  0% accurate  93% accurate  100% accurate 
 
111 John E.B. Myers, Karen J. Saywitz, Gail S. Goodman, Symposium:  Child Abuse:  Psychological Research 
on Children as Witnesses:  Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 23 PAC.I L. J. 
3 (1996). 
 
112 Karen Saywitz, CHILDREN’S CONCEPTIONS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: COURT IS A PLACE TO PLAY 
BASKETBALL, PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY, 131-157 (S.J. Ceci, D.F. Ross & M.P Toglia eds., 1989). 
 
113 Group One (18 children age four to seven), Group Two (19 children age eight to eleven) and Group Three 
(11 children age twelve to fourteen).  The children were also divided into High-Legal-Experience Group (if they 
were actively involved in a court case by being a victim of abuse or being involved in a custody dispute) or Low-
Legal-Experience Group who had not been involved in a court case. 
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Bailiff   0.06% accurate 0% accurate  0.09% accurate 
Court Clerk  0% accurate  0% accurate  0.18% accurate 
Court Reporter 0% accurate  50% accurate  64% accurate 
 
Children between the ages of eight and eleven begin to have a more accurate understanding of 
the court system and the primary people involved (jury, judge, witness and lawyer).  However, 
children in the younger age group have little to no understanding of the court system’s players 
much less the actual processes contemplated at the time of a forensic interview.  Therefore, 
under the formulation set forth in Crawford, children below the age of ten could not reasonably 
expect that statements made during a forensic interview could later be used prosecutorially. 
 
Additional concepts were tested in this study that further demonstrate when children understand 
court-related concepts.  First, all children were asked: “What makes a jury/judge believe a 
witness?”  The children in the older age group were able to identify factors used by judges and 
juries to determine credibility of witnesses, whereas the four- to seven-year-old group assumed 
witnesses always tell the truth and are believed.  Whether the children were in the experienced or 
non-experienced court group did not affect this result.  Second, all children were asked: “How do 
they [judge/jury] decide who wins the case in court?”  The majority of eight- to fourteen-year-
olds were inaccurate in their overall understanding.  They generally believed that judge and jury 
decision-making are dependent on each other.  Some children in this age group believed that the 
judge and jury discuss the case together and that the judge can change the jury’s verdict.  Only 
three children (in the 12-14 age group) understood that the judge and jury were independent from 
each other.  Third, all children were asked the following questions:  “What happens when people 
tell the truth in court?  What happens when people tell a lie in court?  Why is it important that 
people tell the truth in court?”  Here, awareness was significantly different across age groups, but 
not across levels of court experience.  A majority of the four- to seven-year-olds could not 
demonstrate any awareness of the court processes of gathering and determining the truth of 
evidence.  Many of these children believed that the court’s goal was to “punish the criminal or 
give the child to one of his parents,” rather than understanding the actual goals of collecting, 
presenting, and evaluating evidence.  Further, these children held the naïve view that evidence 
would magically present itself and be automatically believed.   
 
Overall, this study demonstrated the following for each age group: 
(1) Four- to Seven-Year-Olds: As a result of their egocentric view of the world, this group of 
children understood some features of the legal system, but not any definable features.  For 
instance, some children understood that a judge is there to talk and listen, but did not understand 
that a judge is in charge of the courtroom or determines a sentence.  This group was unable to 
meet the criteria of accuracy for any of the concepts listed above.  These children could describe 
court-related personnel as sitting, talking, and helping but could not say how these people 
perform their roles nor differentiate between these varied roles.  For example, the children 
interchanged the roles of court, police, and prison and were confused as to whether judges 
remain judges when they go home at night.  This group also understood that witnesses had to tell 
the truth, but only thought that witnesses did so to avoid being punished.  Additionally, these 
children believed that all evidence was necessarily true.  The children had blind faith that 
witnesses tell the truth and, if witnesses themselves, would be surprised by a confrontational 
cross-examination or repeated interviews which are not consistent with that blind faith.  These 
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children further believed that the court process ultimately led to jail and the children could only 
describe court from the point of view of someone who was in trouble.   
(2) Eight- to Eleven-Year-Olds: Children of this group were able to view court as a place to 
work out disagreements, but still struggled with defining features between juries and judges.  
However, these children were better able to understand that judges determine guilt or innocence 
and decide punishment.  They also viewed court similar to church (“You have to be quiet and 
serious”), and that lawyers help people, are on your side (which shows some understanding of 
the adversarial process), and stand up for you in court (which shows representational awareness).  
This group of children showed increased understanding of the differing roles of court-related 
people, the court process and its function.  These children were less likely to confuse the roles of 
the court and the police.  Under the age of ten, children do not understand what a jury does and 
they still confuse the word with similar sounding words.  Between ages eight and eleven, the 
children studied did not understand that impartial people sit as jurors and instead believed that 
victims, witnesses, and defendant’s friends are on the jury.  This group did not understand that 
the jury decides the outcome of the case.   
 
(3) Twelve- to Fourteen-Year-Olds: This group was able to understand the court process and 
place it in context with the overall government.  At this age, these children became aware of the 
function of juries, but are still confused about the role of the jury in making decisions.  Some 
children believe that the judge and jury work together to make a decision.  This demonstrates 
that children do not understand the need to communicate to the jury rather than the judge.  The 
children in this group could understand factors that would be considered when determining 
credibility (such as facial expressions, reputation, personality, comparison with corroborating 
evidence, etc.).   
 
1990 Saywitz Study: “Children’s Knowledge of Legal Terminology”
Dr. Saywitz conducted a second study that analyzed whether age and grade-related patterns 
would be found when testing children on commonly used court terms.114 Children were grouped 
according to school grades, given a list of 35 legal terms and asked to tell everything they knew 
about each word.  The study showed that some legal terms had significant grade-related trends.  
Some terms, which were accurately defined by the sixth graders, were largely inaccurate for the 
kindergartners, such as:  “oath,” “deny,” “lawyer,” “date,” “sworn,” “case,” “jury,” “witness,” 
“judge,” “attorney,” “testify,” and “evidence.”  On the other hand, some legal terms did not have 
grade-related trends because children in all three groups equally understood or misunderstood the 
term.  Terms that were easy for all groups of children to describe accurately were:  “lie,” 
“police,” “remember,” “truth,” “promise,” and “seated.”  Terms that were difficult for all groups 
of children to describe accurately were:  “charges,” “defendant,” “minor,” “motion,” 
“competence,” “petition,” “allegation,” “hearing,” and “strike.”   
 
The study also considered if the age of the children contributed to whether an unfamiliar word 
was mistaken for a similar sounding word (e.g., jury was mistaken for jewelry) or whether a 
word had another meaning outside the court system (e.g., “motion is like waving your arms”).  
These two types of errors were found to be grade-related insofar as the sixth graders made 
 
114 Karen Saywitz, Carol Jaenicke & Lorinda Camparo, Children’s Knowledge of Legal Terminology, 14 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 523 (1990).   
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significantly fewer of these errors than the third graders or kindergartners.  For example, 19 of 20 
kindergartners and 18 of 20 third graders erred with the word “hearing,” whereas only 7 of 20 
sixth graders made the same error.  This demonstrated that the older children were able to 
understand that familiar words may have a different meaning in the court system. 
 
This study demonstrated that “a majority of legal terms tested were not accurately defined until 
the age of 10.”115 Of interest is that younger children admitted lack of knowledge or 
unfamiliarity with a legal term more frequently than older children.  Thus, older children may 
answer a question concerning a court term, yet not understand the term or the question.  On the 
other hand, younger children may think that they understand the meaning of the term and may 
testify accordingly, when in fact they have a different meaning in their mind than the adult does.  
The younger children’s resistance to the prompt, “Could it mean anything else in a court of 
law?” suggests that they had limited metacognitive ability to foresee that a term would mean 
something else in a different, potentially unfamiliar, context.  Moreover, it may be difficult for 
them to shift from one context to another or to continue to generate alternate solutions.116 
However, by third grade, children may be able to fit familiar terms into a different context, such 
as a court setting. 
 
Thus, even if a child within the age-frame of this study is informed during a forensic interview 
that his or her statements may be used in a court proceeding, this does not necessarily mean that 
the child understands what court is or what the purpose of court is.  Furthermore, it is reasonable 
to conclude that if such information is not provided to a child during a forensic interview, it is 
even less likely that the child will intuitively understand the function of court or that the 
interview may be used in a criminal prosecution.   
 
1989 Warren-Leubecker Study: “What Do Children Know about the Legal System and When Do 
They Know It?”
This study from Australia researched the developmental trends in children’s perceptions of the 
legal system, court-related personnel, reasons for going to court, and how decisions are made.117 
The study involved children ranging from two years and nine months to fourteen years in age.  
The children were asked 23 questions, six of which are included below: 
 
1.  Do you know what a courtroom is?  18% of three-year-olds, 40% of six-year-olds, 
85% of seven-year-olds, and up to 100% of thirteen-year-olds answered “yes.” 
2.  Who is in charge of the courtroom? 82% of the three-year-olds indicated they did 
not know and the remaining 18% answered incorrectly (e.g., a doctor).  Answering the 
judge was in charge of a courtroom were 15% of four-year-olds, 25% of five-year-olds, 
56% of six-year-olds, 73% of seven-year-olds, and 92% of eight-year-olds.   
 
115 Id. at 531.   
 
116 Id. at 532.   
 
117 Amye Warren-Leubecker, Carol S. Tate, Ivora D. Hinton and Nicky Ozbek, What Do Children Know 
about the Legal System and When Do They Know It?  First Steps Down a Less Traveled Path in Child Witness 
Research, Perspectives on Children’s Testimony 158-183 (S.J. Ceci, D.F. Ross & M.P Toglia eds., 1989). 
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3.  Who else is in the courtroom (besides the judge)? The chart below demonstrates 
the percentage of correct answers according to age. 
 
Age in years/Percentage Correct 
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Jury 0 0 3 4 8 13 19 28 38 38 40
Lawyer 0 0 3 0 8 15 31 44 36 40 20
Witness 0 11 3 0 0 28 23 20 16 19 30
Police 0 11 10 26 15 36 26 17 23 34 30
Defendant 0 7 0 0 8 15 19 28 27 21 20
Plaintiff 0 0 0 0 4 8 10 15 19 17 20
Audience 9 0 0 4 4 3 2 4 7 2 20
Bailiff  0 0 0 4 4 0 4 6 9 15 0
Court Clerk/Reporter 0       0      0      0      0      3      3      14     15        9        0 
 
4.  What does a lawyer do? Children under the age of seven did not know what a 
lawyer does.  When children reached age ten they began to distinguish between attorneys 
who prosecute or defend others.   
5.  What is the jury and what do they do? A large number of children mistook the 
word “jury” for “jewelry” and were unable to answer this question.  In general, it was not 
until age ten that a significant number of children could understand that a jury is involved 
in decision-making.  However, at age twelve, 30% of these children still did not 
understand the role of a jury in court. 
6.  Why do people go to court? A significant number of younger children did not know 
or were not able to provide a reason as shown by these percentages:  91% of three-year-
olds; 75% of four-year-olds; 62% of five-year-olds; 43% of six-year-olds; 27% of seven-
year-olds; 15% of eight-year-olds; and not until age thirteen were all children able to 
provide an answer. 
 
The results above clearly demonstrate that none of the age groups in the study showed a majority 
understanding of court-related terms, the players involved in court proceedings, the purpose of 
court proceedings, or the most basic level of the purpose of court.  Again, this study is consistent 
with the above-mentioned prior studies in showing that children, particularly under the age of 
ten, do not understand the court process objectively and consequently cannot understand that 
their out-of-court statements may be used in court. 
 
1989 Flin Study: “Children’s Knowledge of Court Proceedings”
A study from the United Kingdom replicated the findings in the studies above.118 Children ages 
six, eight and ten were given twenty legal terms, as well as questions regarding court procedures.  
Consistent with other studies, the ten-year-old children understood more legal terms than the 
younger children.  Only four terms (“policeman,” “rule,” “promise,” and “truth”) did not show a 
 
118 Rhona H. Flin, Yvonne Stevenson, Graham M. Davies, Children’s Knowledge of Court Proceedings, 80 
BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 285-297 (1989). 
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significant difference in accuracy between the age groups.  However, terms like “going to court,” 
“evidence,” “jury,” “lawyer,” “prosecute,” “trial,” and “witness” were clearly not understood by 
the six- and eight-year-old children and only nominally by the ten-year-olds.  When asked what 
kind of people go to court, children ages six and eight did not know or believed that only bad 
people went to court.  However, by age ten, these children understood that all types of people 
could be involved in court proceedings. 
 
1997 Aldridge Study: “Children’s Understanding of Legal Terminology”
A study of British children age five to ten focused on child witnesses’ understanding of the legal 
system.119 This study found that children do not begin to understand what a witness is or what a 
judge is/or does until age ten; none of the children in the study had ever heard the word 
“prosecution,” except for one child who said “prosecution’s when you die.  You get hanged or 
something awful like that.”  In defining what court is, the children studied had the following 
answers:  one five-year-old stated “a court is a sort of jail;” one seven-year-old said that 
witnesses “whip people when they are naughty”; another seven-year-old said “the police think 
that witnesses have done something naughty”; and one seven-year-old described a judge as 
“someone who gets money, like at a pet show.”  
 
1998 Berti Study: “Developing Knowledge of the Judicial System”
Similar results as the Saywitz (1989), Warren-Leubecker (1989), and Flin (1989) studies were 
found in an Italian study from 1998.120 Of particular interest were the student responses to the 
question about what court is:  75% of first graders (mean age 6.7) did not know; 45% of third 
graders (mean age 8.6) did not know; 15% of fifth graders (mean age 10.7) did not know; and 
5% of eighth graders (mean age 13.8) did not know.  In response to describing a public 
prosecutor, all first and third graders either did not know or had never heard of a prosecutor; only 
1 of 20 fifth graders and 4 of 20 eighth graders accurately described a prosecutor.  The younger 
children similarly had difficulty understanding or describing a judge, witness, lawyer, or jury.  
None of the first and third graders understood that a judge must study law to be a judge, whereas 
18% of fifth graders and 94% of eighth graders understood this concept.  Therefore, young child 
witnesses or victims may not understand the role of a judge when testifying. 
 
Overall, results of these six research studies are similar.  Conservatively, each indicates that 
children under the age of ten do not comprehend legal terms, the nature or process of court 
proceedings, or the individuals involved in court proceedings.  As such, the logical conclusion is 
that young children cannot independently appreciate that statements made during a forensic 
interview would later be introduced in a court proceeding  These studies demonstrate that an 
objective person standard cannot be applied to young children under the age of ten.  Instead, the 
above research amply supports the creation of a “reasonable child” standard in determining 
whether out-of-court statements by children are testimonial in light of the Crawford decision.   
 
119 Michelle Aldridge, Kathryn Timmins, Joanne Wood, Children’s Understanding of Legal Terminology:  
Judges Get Money at Pet Shows, Don’t They? 6 CHILD ABUSE REV. 141-146 (1997).   
 
120 Anna Emilia Berti & Elisa Ugolini, Developing Knowledge of the Judicial System:  A Domain-Specific 
Approach, J. OF GENETIC PSYCH. 159(2), pp. 221-236 (1998). 
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VI.  A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE CHILD STANDARD:  A CASE 
ANALYSIS OF BOBADILLA v MINNESOTA 
 
In State v. Bobadilla,121 a three-year-old victim disclosed penetration by the defendant to his 
mother.  At a forensic interview with a CPS worker and police officer, the child also disclosed 
penetration.  At a competency hearing, the three-year-old was declared incompetent to testify.  
At trial, and prior to the decision in Crawford, the prosecutor admitted all the child’s statements, 
including the videotaped forensic interview.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals subsequently 
applied Crawford and declared the forensic interview to be testimonial and not admissible 
because the “…child-protection worker interviewed [the child] in the presence of [the] Detective.  
She asked [the child] whether anyone had hurt him, who hurt him, and how he was hurt. These 
circumstances clearly indicate that the interview was conducted for the purpose of developing a 
case against Bobadilla, and therefore, the answers elicited were testimonial in nature.”  However, 
the child’s statements to his mother were not testimonial because the mother questioned the child 
about the redness around his anus out of concern for his health, not because she expected to 
develop a case against Bobadilla.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals failed to address the 
objective reasonable expectation factor.  The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned this ruling 
and permitted introduction of the child’s forensic interview. 
 
The American Prosecutors Research Institute, in collaboration with the Minnesota Attorney 
Generals Office, filed an Amicus Brief with the Minnesota Supreme Court addressing the child 
development research previously discussed.  An argument was made for the necessity of a 
reasonable child standard for purposes of Crawford. The Minnesota Court of Appeals had 
already acknowledged the difficulty of Crawford in relation to young children in State v. 
Scacchetti.122 In that case, a three-year-old child was discovered by her mother to have bruises, a 
swollen face, and blood in her underwear after having been left in the care of the defendant.  The 
mother took the child to the hospital for a medical examination.  An emergency room physician 
at the Children’s Hospital of Minneapolis discovered a “possible hymen abnormality” and called 
a specialist with the Midwest Children’s Resource Center, a department of the hospital, to 
conduct a further examination.  A nurse practitioner examined the child, which included taking a 
verbal history.  When examining the child’s anal and vaginal areas and when asked if anything 
touched there to cause the noticeable redness, the child said “Tony’s pee pee.”  The child made 
additional disclosures of touching by the defendant during this videotaped examination.  At trial, 
the child did not testify, but the nurse practitioner testified and the videotape of her conversation 
with the child was shown to the jury.  The defendant was convicted and on appeal, the defendant 
claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and cited Crawford in support.   
 
In upholding the conviction and declaring the videotaped statements to the nurse as non-
testimonial, the Scacchetti court reasoned as follows: 
 
On remand, Scacchetti argues R.J.'s disclosures to Edinburgh fall within the third 
and broadest, proposed formulation of testimonial statements because Edinburgh 
 
121 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006). 
 
122 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
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‘does not provide ongoing care for children,’ ‘clearly [knew] that her 
examinations may be used as evidence in the criminal case,’ and ‘always tapes 
interviews.’ But in order for Scacchetti to succeed on this argument, he must 
show, under Crawford, that the circumstances surrounding the contested 
statements led the three-year-old to reasonably believe her disclosures would be 
available for use at a later trial, or that the circumstances would lead a reasonable 
child of her age to have that expectation. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
Scacchetti's arguments fail to show this.123 
Thus, the Scacchetti court began to lay the foundation for the creation of a “reasonable 
child” standard when analyzing child statements pursuant to Crawford.
In discussing a “reasonable child” standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in D.M.S. v. 
Barber:124 
[A] reasonable person under the legal disability of infancy is incapable of 
recognizing or understanding that he or she has been sexually abused. The 
delayed discovery statute provides that the six-year period of limitation does not 
begin to run until a reasonable person would know of the sexual abuse. Minn. 
Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a); see, Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 
1996). Thus, it follows that the six-year period of limitation does not begin to run 
on a cause of action arising from childhood sexual abuse until the victim reaches 
the age of majority. 
 
Thus, a “reasonable person” standard for children takes into account the abilities of children by 
acknowledging that infancy is a “legal disability” requiring a different standard of assessment. 
 
Likewise, as discussed in Toetschinger v. Ihnot,125 when assessing the level of negligence of 
children in personal injury matters, Minnesota courts have consistently held "[i]n the case of a 
child, reasonable care is that care which a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, training 
and experience as Paul Toetschinger at the time of the accident would have used under like 
circumstances."126 
The Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in Bobadilla in February 2006 and held that 
the child’s statements during the forensic interview were not testimonial.  In determining 
whether the child’s statement was testimonial, the Court held “when both a questioner and a 
declarant are not, to any substantial degree, acting with an eye toward trial, courts have 
 
123 Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d at 396. 
 
124 645 N.W.2d 383, 389 (Minn. 2002). 
 
125 250 N.W.2d 204, 217 (Minn. 1977). 
 
126 See also, Rosvold v. Johnson, 169 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1969); Pelzer v. Lange,  93 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 
1958); Bruno v. Belmonte, 90 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. 1958); Watts v. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1955); Audette 
v. Lindahl, 42 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1950); Eckhardt v. Hanson,  264 N.W. 776 (Minn. 1936).   
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consistently held that the declarant’s statements are not testimonial.”127 The Court went on to 
explain that even if a questioner and declarant have multiple purposes, one of which may include 
an eye toward trial, this does not automatically declare the statement to be testimonial. 
 
For instance, a police officer will often be acting, to at least some degree, with an 
eye toward trial, even when responding to an emergency.  But where preservation 
for trial is merely incidental to other purposes, such as assessing and responding 
to an immediate danger, a statement will not be deemed testimonial.  See, e.g., 
Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 458 (statement was not testimonial where an officer 
taking a statement “was principally in the process of accomplishing the 
preliminary tasks of securing and assessing the scene”).128 
*** 
Finally, we note that an inquiry into the purpose of a reasonable government 
questioner or declarant in the relevant situation also conforms with Crawford’s 
core categories of testimonial statements—“prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and * * * police 
interrogations”—since a reasonable questioner taking a statement in any one of 
those situations would always exhibit a substantial concern with producing a 
statement for use in legal proceedings.129 
Commenting on the forensic interviewing procedure, the Court noted, “the CornerHouse 
technique instructs the interviewer to ask nonleading questions, to use terms children would 
understand, and to progress quickly since young children have short attention spans.”130 
The Bobadilla Court also took an important step in the analysis of forensic interviews after 
Crawford by discussing the purpose of a forensic interview, including statutory requirements to 
conduct an interview, and what children understand about interviews.  The Bobadilla Court 
distinguished all prior cases finding forensic interviews to be testimonial by noting “these cases 
have consistently determined that children’s statements are testimonial in situations where either 
the declarant or government questioner was acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a 
statement for trial.”131 Articulating the reasons that this forensic interview was non-testimonial, 
the court reasoned as follows: 
 
But in this case, neither the child-protection worker nor the child declarant, T.B., 
were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.  The 
parties do not dispute that the interview of T.B. was conducted in accord with a 
 
127 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 251. 
 
128 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 252. 
 
129 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 253. 
 
130 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 247.  The R.A.T.A.C. forensic interviewing protocol created by CornerHouse is 
the protocol taught through the Finding Words program and used throughout the country to interview children. 
 
131 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 253. 
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statutory scheme for reporting, investigating, and responding to threats to 
children’s health or welfare.  Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2004).  This statutory 
scheme provides that certain individuals must report the maltreatment of minors 
either to law enforcement or to the local welfare agency.  Id.  Following a report 
of abuse, “the local welfare agency shall immediately conduct an assessment 
including gathering information on the existence of substance abuse and offer 
protective social services for purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding 
and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and preserving 
family life whenever possible.”  Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a).  To the extent 
that an allegation of abuse alleges a violation of a criminal statute, the local 
welfare agency and law enforcement must “coordinate the planning and execution 
of their respective investigation and assessment efforts to avoid a duplication of 
fact-finding efforts and multiple interviews.”  Id.  Both the welfare agency and 
law enforcement must prepare separate reports.  Id.  The local welfare agency is 
required to use a “nondirective” question-and-answer format and to make audio-
video recordings of the interviews of alleged victims of sexual abuse.  Minn. Stat. 
§ 626.556, subd. 10(j)(2).132 
Thus, Minnesota has recognized that children should not be held to adult standards.  Therefore, 
when assessing whether a child could reasonably understand that statements made during a 
forensic interview could later be used prosecutorially or in court, a “reasonable child” standard 
should be applied consistent with child development research.   
 
Minnesota is not the only state to recognize the special needs of child victims and witnesses.  As 
outlined in Section IV(B)(2), courts in Colorado, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, 
Washington, and the Military Court of Criminal Appeals have also accurately discussed what is 
reasonable for an objective child to understand about the investigation and court process during 
the phase of a forensic interview.   
VII. A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE STANDARD TO 
FORENSIC INTERVIEWS 
 
Since the decision in Davis/Hammon133, courts are beginning to abandon the objective 
reasonable declarant analysis outlined in Crawford134 in favor of determining the primary 
purpose of the interview when questions are being asked by law enforcement officers.  Although 
abandoning the objective reasonable standard is not in-line with Crawford, in situations where a 
law enforcement officer has questioned a child regarding abuse or neglect, or witnessing a crime, 
the officer’s purpose does not automatically determine that the child’s statements are testimonial 
or not pursuant to Davis/Hammon. As stated earlier, it is important to understand the nuances of 
Davis/Hammon, including looking objectively at all the circumstances occurring when the 
 
132 Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 254. 
 
133 Davis/Hammon, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (U.S. 2006). 
 
134 Crawford, 514 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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statement was being taken.135 This is not limited solely to the primary purpose of the law 
enforcement investigator.  Rather, a court should look to all the circumstances, including the 
mind set of the child. 
 
In Minnesota v. Warsame136, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the primary purpose 
standard by viewing a number of different factors.  A police officer was responding to a 
domestic violence complaint when he found the victim on the side of the road.  When the officer 
approached her, she stated “my boyfriend just beat me up” and the officer determined that this 
was the victim from the call.  In response to an open ended question, the crying and shaking 
victim provided detail regarding the assault, including that her sisters were present in the home 
during the assault.  The defendant had also fled the home with one of the victim’s sisters.  At 
trial, the victim did not appear and the issue on appeal was whether the victim’s statements to the 
officer violated the Confrontation Clause.  In analyzing the case under Davis/Hammon, the Court 
acknowledged that a statement, even under an excited state of mind, can move from non-
testimonial to testimonial.  The question was where to draw the line?    
 
The Court found that an on-going emergency existed during the open-ended part of her statement 
and noted that the defendant had fled with one of the sisters was an important factor to consider. 
 
By contrast, the situation confronting police here was more complex. Although 
Warsame had left the scene of the alleged assault, he was reported to be with one 
of the victim's sisters, and the other sister, possibly injured, remained at the scene 
of the alleged assault, which was a short distance from where the questioning of 
N.A. occurred. In this case, unlike the situations in Davis and Hammon, police 
faced possible emergency situations regarding three locations: the street curb, 
where N.A. was being attended to, the house nearby, where her sister I.A. 
remained, and the fleeing vehicle, where another sister was with Warsame. 
 
We conclude that the "ongoing emergency" referred to in Davis as marking out-
of-court statements non-testimonial need not be limited to the complainant's 
predicament or the location where she is questioned by police. As long as a 
possible emergency situation, occurring at another location or involving another 
person, is related to the complainant's own situation and is one which can be 
clarified by questioning her, the purpose of the questioning may be considered as 
for the primary purpose of enabling police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency, making the complainant's statements non-testimonial.137 
135 Davis/Hammon, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, at *16. 
 
136 No. A05-488, 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 154 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov 21, 2006). 
 
137 Id. at *11-12. 
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In finding the initial narrative account from the victim was non-testimonial due to the on-going 
emergency involving other potential victims, the Court also noted that the officer was not taking 
notes as he was gathering this initial information and that also contributed to the non-testimonial 
nature of the situation.138 This analysis can become important when addressing statements made 
by child victims and witnesses.  The Warsame Court looked to whether there were other victims 
in jeopardy, including other people in the home, and whether the defendant had access to those 
potential victims.  In most child abuse cases, the perpetrator is a family member.139 For those 
cases where there are other children in the home, a factor that must be addressed during a 
forensic interview, even if conducted by a law enforcement officer, is whether there are other 
children in jeopardy that need immediate protection and possible removal from the home.  Even 
if the child being interviewed is safely out of the home, the interviewer must determine whether 
the perpetrator is residing in the home and whether other children are at risk.  Therefore, when 
addressing the primary purpose of a law enforcement officer’s interview, the existence of other 
children at risk in the home should be addressed in determining whether the emergency is on-
going.  If children are in the home, the danger and emergency is on-going and the interview 
should be deemed non-testimonial. 
 
If courts adopt the Davis/Hammon primary purpose standard for child statements, it is necessary 
to remember that the objective circumstances must also be viewed when determining whether a 
statement is testimonial.  As such, a young child’s statement should never be deemed testimonial 
for these reasons:  (1) most states require forensic interviews of children to protect the health and 
welfare of the child;140 (2) the forensic interview is not conducted primarily for prosecution, but 
serves the needs of multiple team members, including law enforcement, child protection, health 
care providers, mental health professionals, and prosecution authorities;141 (3) forensic 
interviews conducted under the Child First Doctrine are not for the primary purpose of 
prosecution;142 (4) considering the developmental and cognitive abilities of children when 
making statements of abuse is still a factor to be addressed when looking objectively at the 
circumstances of the interview as outlined in Davis/Hammon;143 and (5) in viewing the objective 
circumstances surrounding the child’s statement, a court must look to all factors including the 
child’s belief about future court use of the statement, the primary purpose of the interviewer 
 
138 Id. at *16. 
 
139 “In 2002, one or both parents were involved in 79 percent of child abuse or neglect fatalities.”  Child Abuse 
and Neglect Fatalities:  Statistics and Intervention, in NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
INFORMATION (April 2004), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf.  “Nearly 84 
percent (83.4%) of victims were abused by a parent acting alone or with another person.  Approximately two-fifths 
(38.8%) of child victims were maltreated  by their mothers acting alone; another 18.3 percent were maltreated by 
their fathers acting alone; 18.3 percent were abused by both parents.” Child Maltreatment 2004, in U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES 28 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cm04.pdf. 
 
140 See footnote 51. 
 
141 See Section IV(A). 
 
142 See footnote 50. 
 
143 See Section V. 
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asking the questions, whether there is an on-going emergency, whether additional children or 
potential victims are still within the abusive home, and other surrounding circumstances.   
VIII.  STATEMENTS OF CHILDREN DURING MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS SHOULD BE 
NON-TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS 
 
A. Statements Made Pursuant to the Medical Hearsay Exception Should be Non-Testimonial 
Since Health Care Providers are not Govermental Agents
Health care providers are, with more frequency, interviewing and taking statements from 
children regarding incidents of abuse.  As such, these health care providers have been put into 
the framework as some forensic interviewers and are now having to defend their interview after 
Crawford. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) is the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to 
the hearsay rule which allows medical professionals to testify to statements made by a patient 
during a medical examination.  These statements are allowed into evidence, in spite of a 
preclusion against hearsay testimony, for the reason that statements made by a patient to a doctor 
are presumed inherently truthful.  A patient is expected to be honest with a health care provider 
in order to receive an accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment.   
 
After the new rule of Crawford, most courts have agreed that physicians who conduct a medical 
examination of a victim can still testify to statements of the victim that pertain to the diagnosis 
and treatment for the reason that the health care provider has a job to perform in assisting the 
patient regardless of prosecution or collection of evidence.  As such, this non-governmental 
agent does not meet the parameters outlined in Crawford.144 Statements made to Emergency 
Medical Technicians (EMTs) have also been permitted into evidence through the medical 
hearsay exception, even after Crawford.145 Psychological professionals have also been permitted 
 
144 State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Purcell, 846 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct.. 
2006); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 
2005); State v. Johnson, No. 0411007637, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 253 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); People v. Cage, 120 
Cal. App. 4th 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Davis, 2005 Ohio 6224 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (statements to a 
paramedic and physician are non-testimonial); State v. Molina, No. 53730-0-I, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 
2058 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“The appellate court found that the doctor asked how the victim got the wound. She 
responded that her ex-boyfriend stabbed her. The victim's response was necessary to ascertain the nature of the 
wound inflicted and to provide her with appropriate medical treatment. The statement was reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis and treatment of her injuries. Her statements were admissible under the statement for medical treatment 
exception of Wash. R. Evid. 803(a)(4) because a doctor or social worker may recommend counseling or escape from 
the dangerous domestic environment as part of a treatment plan.”); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004) 
(statements of a four-year-old victim of sexual abuse to a physician, including the identity of the assailant, were held 
non-testimonial.  “We believe on the facts of this case that the victim's statement to the doctor was not a 
"testimonial" statement under Crawford. As discussed above, the victim's identification of Vaught as the perpetrator 
was a statement made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. In the present case, the victim was taken to 
the hospital by her family to be examined and the only evidence regarding the purpose of the medical examination, 
including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms, was to obtain medical treatment. There was no 
indication of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of government involvement in the 
initiation or course of the examination.”) 
 
145 State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (The identity of her assailant was allowed into 
evidence through the testimony of the paramedics since it related to the paramedic’s diagnosis and treatment of the 
victim.) 
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to testify concerning statements made by victims as these statements relate to diagnosing and 
treating the patient.146 The primary concern about medical statements after Crawford relate to 
SANE/SAFE professionals examining the victim and taking statements concerning the crime.   
 
B. Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners (SANEs) and Sexual Assault Forensic Examiners 
(SAFEs) May Assist with the Collection of Evidence for Law Enforcement, but Victim/Patients 
Likely do not Understand that their Statements During a Medical Examination Could be 
Introduced in Court
There has been great concern about the role of SANE/SAFE professionals147 in a post-Crawford 
world.  SANEs are specially trained in taking a history for purposes of diagnosis and treatment 
and the collection and preservation of evidence.  SANEs  have four primary goals: 1) to take a 
history for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment; 2) to provide a head to toe assessment for 
trauma; 3) to perform a detailed genital examination; and 4) to collection of evidence.  All of this 
is conducted during a compassionate and caring medical-legal evaluation that should include 
diagnosis and treatment relating to the sexual assault, crisis intervention, and referrals for follow-
up care.148 
With the intertwining of forensic evidence collection and law enforcement interviews, can SANE 
and SAFE professionals still testify in court regarding medical statements made by victims?  Are 
they just another arm of law enforcement performing the duties of the investigating officer?  If a 
victim (whether child or adult) is examined by a trained SANE or SAFE professional for 
purposes of gathering evidence of a crime, will statements by the victim be deemed testimonial 
thus requiring the victim to testify?  We can gain some insight in how to proceed with these 
medical interviews based on the following cases.   
 
In Commonwealth v. Brown,149 the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that the medical notes 
and records created by a SANE (who was deceased at the time of trial) were non-testimonial 
because the trial court redacted any accusatory statements from the report and that the remainder 
of the report was as a result of a physical examination and not created in an adversarial setting.  
In clarifying its ruling, the court compared SANE records to laboratory results, which have been 
held to be non-testimonial in other jurisdictions.  “Critically, such laboratory reports do not 
involve statements to the police or other government agents acting in their stead, which accuse 
another person of a crime. (citations omitted) Such reports are, moreover, not prepared in an 
adversarial setting.”150 The court noted that SANE reports are not created for the benefit of 
 
146 State v. Sheppard, 842 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 
147 A Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) is a Registered Nurse who is specially trained in the forensic 
examination of sexual assault victims.  A Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner (SAFE) is not a registered nurse, but is 
trained to conducted sexual assault examinations.   
 
148 OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL 
ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION GUIDE P. 8. (1999) 
 
149 No. 3082-05-1, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 152 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
150 Brown, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 152 at *7-9. 
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prosecution and that medical examination is conducted “before a suspect is identified or even 
before a homicide is suspected."151 
Similarly, Ohio v. Lee152 addressed statements made by an adult sexual assault victim to a SANE.  
The Ohio Court of Appeals found that the statements of the victim to the SANE during the 
examination were non-testimonial: 
 
However, there is no reason for a rape victim to believe that when she reiterates 
those same statements to a sexual assault nurse that they will be used for anything 
other than treatment. As such, upon being referred to DOVE153 and signing a 
medical consent form, a reasonable person would believe that DOVE served two 
functions: 1) providing medical treatment to the victim; and 2) preserving physical 
evidence of the crime. The "white smock of a medical professional" is indeed 
relevant to our analysis. The victim in these cases is being treated by a nurse. In 
the instant case, no law enforcement officials were present at any time before, 
during, or after the examination. As such, there is no reason to conclude that a 
reasonable person under the same circumstances confronting the rape victim would 
believe that her nurse is acting as an investigatory arm of the State when 
questioning the victim about details of the crime.154 
State v. Stahl, 2005 Ohio 1137 (2005), also held that statements to a nurse by a sexual assault 
victim can be properly admitted under the medical hearsay exception as they are non-testimonial 
statements not intertwined with law enforcements’ investigatory duties.  However, the Nevada 
Supreme Court held in Medina v. State,155 that statements made by an adult sexual assault victim 
to a SANE were testimonial.  The court affirmed the conviction and found the error to be 
harmless.  Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning is important to understand as it relates to health 
care providers diagnosing and treating patients, or collecting evidence for law enforcement:   
 
During trial, [the SANE examiner] testified as to what [the victim] told her about 
the rape during the sexual assault examination. … In Flores, this court held that 
the witnesses' hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the 
witnesses were either police operatives or were tasked with reporting instances of 
child abuse for the prosecution. Here, [the SANE examiner] was a police 
 
151 Brown, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 152 at *9 (citing footnote 3). 
 
152 2005 Ohio 996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
153 “The Summa DOVE Program, (Developing Options for Violent Emergencies), provides compassionate 
care to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, elder abuse, and neglect. One of the first of its kind in the 
United States, the Summa DOVE program provides specialized medical care to victims, assists law enforcement 
personnel through the timely and comprehensive collection of evidence from suspects of violent crimes and provides 
specialized clinical education to health care providers to increase the quality of medical care available to victims of 
violence.”  See, http://www.summahealth.org/common/templates/contentindex.asp?ID=337.
154 Lee, 2005 Ohio 996 at P8. 
 
155 131 P.3d 15 (Nev. 2006). 
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operative. She testified that she is a "forensics nurse" and that she gathers 
evidence for the prosecution for possible use in later prosecutions. As such, the 
circumstances under which [the victim] made the statements to [the SANE 
examiner] would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the 
statements would be available for use at a later trial. [The victim] was not 
available for trial, and Medina had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her 
regarding the statements to [the SANE examiner]. Therefore, the district court 
manifestly erred when it admitted the statements [the victim] made to [the SANE 
examimer] during the sexual assault examination.156 
Other courts have effectively addressed the importance of child statements to medical 
professionals and properly analyzed the child’s understanding at the time of making the 
statement.  The case of People v. Vigil,157 as discussed in Section IV(B)(2), accurately assessed 
what an objective seven-year-old would reasonably expect in being interviewed by a physician 
regarding abuse.  Similarly, in Ohio v. Edinger,158 the child was interviewed by a social worker 
employed by Children's Hospital in the Child Advocacy Center.  At trial, the social worker 
testified that the sole purpose for the interview with the child was for medical diagnosis and 
treatment.  The role of the social worker was not to report to the police or be involved in 
removing the child from the home.  Although the police were allowed to observe the interview 
via closed circuit television, the police did not arrange the interview and the child was not aware 
that the police were observing.   
 
Ohio v. Muttart159 addressed statements of children ages 5 and 6 to health care providers.  The 
court found their statements to medical personnel to be non-testimonial.  In this case, three 
separate interviewers/counselors obtained statements from the children solely for medical and 
psychological purposes.  One interviewer worked at Children’s Hospital and obtained the 
medical and social history from the child before a medical exam.  The other two interviewers 
were licensed clinical counselors; one conducted the initial assessment in order to make a 
diagnosis, and the second conducted play therapy.  The court noted that with one child, there was 
no police involvement prior to the counselors’ speaking with the child and that all three 
counselors acted independent from any subsequent police involvement.  These therapeutic 
interviews with the child had no law enforcement involvement and, therefore, were not 
testimonial.   
In Minnesota v. Scacchetti,160 the three-year-old child was not competent to testify, but 
statements made by the child to a nurse during a medical assessment were admitted at trial.  This 
court held that the child’s statements were non-testimonial and provide important language about 
 
156 Medina, 131 P.3d at 20-21. 
 
157 127 P.3d  916 (Colo. 2006).   
 
158 2006 Ohio 1527 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).   
 
159 2006 Ohio 2506 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 
160 711 N.W.2d 508  (Minn. 2006). 
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the potential testifying-duty of a nurse examiner.  In this case, the nurse followed a protocol that 
consisted of a verbal exam and physical exam.  The exam was videotaped according to protocol 
which allows for subsequent review by a physician.  The nurse saw the child twice:  once for an 
exam and then for a follow-up assessment.  The Court relied on eight factors that were set forth 
in Minnesota v. Wright161 and clarified in Bobadilla v. Minnesota162: “We clarified that, of the 
factors, the central considerations are ‘the purpose of the statements from the perspective of the 
declarant and from the perspective of the government questioner,’ in other words, ‘whether 
either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce 
a statement for trial.’”163 
The Scacchetti court found that the nurse was not a governmental agent since the child did not 
come for her assessment via a governmental agent.  However, the court noted:   
 
Even if we had concluded that [the nurse] was acting in concert with or as an 
agent of the government, our conclusion that [the child’s] statements to [the 
nurse] are not testimonial would not change. The record here indicates that [the 
nurse’s] purpose in interviewing and examining [the child] was to assess her 
medical condition. Both [the nurse and physician] testified that their purpose in 
evaluating children such as [this child] is to determine whether the child has been 
abused and, if necessary, to connect the child and family to appropriate services. 
There is no evidence or other testimony in the record to the contrary. The fact that 
MCRC generally does not have ongoing contact with the child after the 
assessment does not minimize the medical purpose for which the assessment is 
conducted.164 
Finally, the court concluded, “the mere fact that [the nurse] may be called to testify in court 
regarding sexual abuse cases does not transform the medical purpose of the assessments into a 
prosecutorial purpose, nor is there any evidence that [the nurse] had a prosecutorial purpose here.  
*** Thus, even if we were to conclude that [the nurse’s] assessments of the child] had, as a 
secondary purpose, the preservation of testimony for trial, [the child’s] statement would still not 
be testimonial. Because the broad purpose of [the nurse’s] assessments was [the child’s] medical 
health, any subsequent testimony that [the nurse] was required to give did not change her 
assessment purpose.”165 
161 701 N.W.2d 802, 812-813 (Minn. 2006).  “(1) whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the 
declarant's purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain assistance); (3) whether it was the police or the 
declarant who initiated the conversation; (4) the location where the statements were made (e.g., the declarant's 
home, a squad car, or the police station); (5) the declarant's emotional state when the statements were made; (6) the 
level of formality and structure of the conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the officers' purpose in 
speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the scene, determine what happened, or collect evidence); and (8) if and 
how the statements were recorded.” 
 
162 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006). 
163 Scacchetti, 711 N.W. 2d at 513. 
 
164 Scacchetti, 711 N.W. 2d at 515. 
 
165 Scacchetti, 711 N.W. 2d  at 516. 
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McDonald v. State,166 addressed statements made by a two-year-old during a medical 
examination.  The child told a nurse that "Daddy did it" and "Daddy hit me" during a medical 
examination.  The court held that the child's statements were nontestimonial and exceptions to 
the hearsay rule in accordance with Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). The Court reasoned “it is illogical to 
conclude that a two year old child would have considered whether her statements to Rivera 
regarding bruises on her body would reach prosecutorial authorities and be used against 
McDonald.”167
Lastly, In re A. J. A.168 involved a five-year-old child spontaneously disclossing abuse to her 
parents.  The police were contacted and they recommended the parents take the child to the 
Midwest Children’s Resource Center for a medical exam and interview.  A registered nurse 
examined and interviewed the child and then reported her findings to the police as required under 
Minnesota law.  The court found that a reasonable 5-year-old would not expect her statements to 
the nurse to later be used in court.  Therefore, the statements were non-testimonial. 
 
As shown with these cases involving statements made by children during medical examinations, 
it is important to understand that children may not comprehend that a doctor could take their 
statements and replay them in a courtroom.  Due to the limited cognitive understanding of 
children about court, making this assumption about children is inaccurate and will result in error 
by excluding their statement in court. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
As courts continue to struggle to define which out-of-court hearsay statements are “testimonial,” 
the legal implications for child abuse investigations and prosecutions will continue to develop.  
Although some guidance can be drawn from cases that interpret Crawford, it is expected that 
courts across the country will continue to provide conflicting opinions given that the new rule 
regarding “testimonial statements” was not fully defined in Crawford. Nonetheless, judges, 
prosecutors and all child protection professionals owe it to their child victims and witnesses to 
fully understand Crawford and properly apply the new rule to cases.  Failure to do so will result 
in countless tragedies in the court system for our most vulnerable victims and offenders 
remaining free to re-victimize those who need the most protection. 
 
Due to the open interpretation of the term “testimonial” as outlined in Crawford, Davis and 
Hammon, prosecutors must be educated sufficiently regarding these cases in order to effectively 
argue a child-friendly standard to the court.  Although it may appear that United States Supreme 
Court, and lower appellate and trial courts, are closing the courtroom doors to young child 
victims by labeling their out-of-court statements as “testimonial,” it is difficult to believe that 
this is the intention of the Court.  However, until the United States Supreme Court accepts a 
 
166 No. 04-05-00128-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7416 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
167 McDonald 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7416 . at *4. 
 
168 No. A06-479, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 988 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
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child abuse case that involves Crawford issues, everyone involved with the criminal justice 
system will continue to struggle. 
 
